Abstract:
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, the Congress initiated a series of studies that concluded intelligence analysts had failed to “connect the dots” before the attacks because nobody was firmly in charge, individual and organizational responsibility and accountability were diffuse, and there were no common standards and personnel practices in place across the Intelligence Community (IC). In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), which established the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), directed the DNI to establish clear goals and set priorities, and to develop and implement common personnel standards across the IC. A new policy on performance management was established in 2008 and implemented over the following two years. This dissertation, based on empirical data and analysis of the implementation of the program, examines the effectiveness of the new performance management program. It concludes that the program worked reasonably well in the Department of Defense and independent agencies (though noting problems in implementation), but did not work as well in the smaller populations of IC employees scattered among the five other Departments. The policy implications of these findings will inform Congress and executive branch agencies on ways to improve congressional mandates and the implementation of performance management systems.
