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Revisiting the Constitution: A Case For Parliamentary System in Central Asia?

Show simple item record Abdukadirov, Sherzod 2007-05-16T15:11:20Z 2007-05-16T15:11:20Z 2007-05-16T15:11:20Z
dc.description.abstract Institutional design can impact the dynamics of power relations in authoritarian regimes. Under the presidential system in Central Asian states, the elite factions agree upon a presidential candidate before the elections and then ensure their candidate’s victory by manipulating the elections. As the cost of exclusion in this process is very high, every elite faction is forced to collude with the other factions. Under a parliamentary system, bargaining among the elites in selection of the head of state would occur after the elections as the elites would have to first secure parliamentary seats to be able to vote for the head of state. Such a process would reduce the stakes in each particular election, making it harder for the elites to manipulate elections yet safer to allow some opposition. Furthermore, the balance of power among the elites in parliament would be decided by the people, giving them a voice in the process.
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.relation.ispartofseries GMU School of Public Policy Doctoral Working Paper Series en
dc.relation.ispartofseries 0607-003 en
dc.subject institutional design en_US
dc.subject presidential en_US
dc.subject parliamentary en_US
dc.subject Central Asia en_US
dc.subject elections en_US
dc.subject Sherzod Abdukadirov en_US
dc.title Revisiting the Constitution: A Case For Parliamentary System in Central Asia? en
dc.type Working Paper en

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