Abstract:
Lightweight authenticated ciphers are crucial in many resource-constrained applications,including online payment, edge computing, and the Internet of Things. However, the current
standard AES-GCM is not adequate for many applications. Recent developments in Quantum computing increased the urgency of deploying Post-Quantum cryptographic standards
that withstand quantum and classic attacks. As a response to these needs, the US National
Institute of Standards (NIST) coordinates two standardization processes to evaluate and
ratify suitable algorithms.
Although resistance to mathematical cryptanalysis is paramount, cost, performance,
and resistance to side-channel attacks are among the most critical selection criteria. The
development of side-channel protected implementations is necessary for a fair evaluation of
candidates since algorithms have a different cost of protection. Real-world implementations,
especially lightweight applications with little physical security, are vulnerable to side-channel
attacks. As a result, producing side-channel resistant implementations and quantifying the
impact of countermeasures on cost and performance shed light on how a given algorithm
will perform in practical settings.
In this research, we study the effect of applying side-channel countermeasures to the
NIST LWC candidates Xoodyak and TinyJAMBU and the NIST PQC candidate Saber
with a concentration on hardware implementations. Specifically, we employ the Domain-
Oriented masking countermeasure to produce two first-order protected implementations of
Xoodyak. For TinyJAMBU, we present a flexible implementation that is synthesizable for
arbitrary order of protection. For Saber, we first develop a lightweight design and then apply
masking countermeasures. We also report the protection overhead in terms of performance
and cost.
In parallel, we developed the tools necessary for this research to improve on the existing
FOBOS platform. We significantly improved the efficiency and flexibility of the system while
using affordable hardware components. Our upgrades resulted in an efficient system capable
of performing leakage assessment and attacks on FPGA cryptographic implementations. We
also improved the usability of the system to address research and education needs. Our work
aims at establishing methodologies and providing tools to develop and evaluate LWC and
PQC candidates. Also, the results provide a more realistic look at the practical cost and
performance of the algorithms studied.
