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Government Contracts and the Organization of Firms

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dc.contributor.advisor Schintler, Laurie
dc.contributor.author Kazmi, Hina
dc.creator Kazmi, Hina
dc.date 2016-07-15
dc.date.accessioned 2018-05-25T15:30:55Z
dc.date.available 2018-05-25T15:30:55Z
dc.identifier doi:10.13021/G8H68C
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/1920/10984
dc.description.abstract Government is a market maker in which it sets own demand and prices by contracting out a wide array of its functions. Government contracts are usually long-term with various levels of asset specificity. Transaction Cost Economics treats these factors as contractual risks for opportunism, ex-post. Firms organize themselves to safeguard from such risks, but government is often exposed to them since it mostly buys goods and services instead of producing them in-house. Using government satellite programs, this research examines the market for government contracting from the context of contracts, contractors and programs. The research is organized in three papers: (1) Distribution of Risks in Government Contracts (2) Buyer-Seller Networks in the Market for Government Contracting, (3) Cost of Contracting-out Program Management. The research provides a general framework to analyze various market sectors associated with government contracting.
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.subject transaction cost economics en_US
dc.subject opportunism en_US
dc.subject public programs en_US
dc.subject asset specificity en_US
dc.subject inter-firm networks en_US
dc.subject contractual risks en_US
dc.title Government Contracts and the Organization of Firms en_US
dc.type Dissertation en_US
thesis.degree.name Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy en_US
thesis.degree.level Doctoral en_US
thesis.degree.discipline Public Policy en_US
thesis.degree.grantor George Mason University en_US


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