

The Legacy of Empire in International Relations

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Abstract In the aftermath of the cold war, not only have many nationalist disputes persisted, but many more have erupted, especially in and around the former Soviet Union. Is this nationalist conflict a temporary phenomenon that is likely to disappear, or is it a deep-seated problem that will persist and possibly grow worse? The working hypothesis that this study will examine is that, aside from continued fighting, there are only three alternative outcomes to ethnic conflict occurring within nations: (1) the development of peaceful, multiethnic societies within existing nations, in which ethnic distinctions become unimportant; (2) maintenance of the status quo by force, in which dissatisfied groups are unable to achieve their goals; and (3) the breakdown of existing nations and the proliferation of small, more ethnically homogenous states.

This study will argue that unless governments can bring about the first outcome (development of a peaceful multiethnic society), it will be extremely difficult in the post-cold war era for them to achieve the second outcome (maintenance of the status quo by force). Achieving the first outcome will also be difficult; although many regimes have the stated goal of building a society in which ethnic distinctions become unimportant, they act to preserve existing patterns of ethnic dominance. The third outcome (the proliferation of small, ethnically homogenous states) is often regarded as the most difficult to achieve, but it may be the most likely outcome if larger nations cannot be held together on either a voluntary or involuntary basis.

The cold war is over, but conflict and tension persist in many parts of the world. There was great euphoria about the prospects for the emergence of a relatively peaceful "new world order" and the spread of democracy following the 1989 downfall of communism in Eastern Europe and the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. Now, however, there is pessimism over the prospect of growing nationalist conflict in and around the former USSR, persistent ethnic conflict in many parts of the third world, and the effect these conflicts will have on the West.

As a result of this nationalist conflict, there has been a growing trend to dismiss as overoptimistic the conclusions of Francis Fukuyama and others about the spread of democracy leading to a peaceful system of international relations. In various parts of the former USSR, former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere, extremely virulent forms of nationalism have arisen which seem to be popularly supported.

Yet, Fukuyama and others do appear to have correctly described the nature of international relations among established democracies. The prospect of war among the established democracies of the West is virtually unthinkable [1]. Democratization in Russia has led not just theorists, but also Western governments, to conclude that the prospect of war between Russia and the West has also declined dramatically [2]. Indeed, the only scenario under which conflict between Russia and the West seems possible is if

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democracy is supplanted by authoritarianism in Moscow. Even then, while tensions between Russia and the West would undoubtedly reemerge, conflict between them is hardly inevitable, just as no direct Soviet-American conflict took place even at the height of the cold war.

Fukuyama was right about something else too: there is a growing preference for democracy among nations throughout the world [3]. This has been demonstrated by real progress toward democratization in diverse regions, such as much of the former USSR, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. There are still a large number of dictatorships, but many of these are on the defensive against widespread domestic pressure for democratization, as in China, Thailand, and Burma. Only one ideology, political Islam, appears to be a serious rival to democracy for popular support. The appeal of political Islam, though, is limited to predominantly Muslim countries. Many observers also dispute the assertion that political Islam (which has many manifestations) is necessarily antidemocratic [4].

Because Fukuyama and others are right that relations among established democracies do not involve the use of force, and that democratization is spreading, their theories would lead us to expect that the wave of nationalist conflict now occurring should only be a temporary phenomenon. As democratization takes root, more and more nations will see diplomacy and democratic processes as more appropriate means of conflict resolution than war. The peaceful system of international relations that exists among the established democracies can be expected to spread along with democratization. Even dictatorships will become fearful that engaging in conflict will be unpopular domestically and will only encourage their increasingly democratic minded citizenry to overthrow them [5].

But this conclusion that the spread of democratization will result in the current wave of nationalist conflict being a temporary phenomenon is overly optimistic. It will be argued here that not only is this nationalist conflict likely to be a chronic and widespread feature of post-cold war international relations, but that its intensity and frequency is largely due to the increasingly widespread desire for democracy that Fukuyama sees occurring.

Fukuyama himself pointed out why the desire for democracy would not necessarily lead to stable democracy or peaceful relations among states:

The reason why liberal democracy has not become universal, or remained stable once it has achieved power, lies ultimately in the incomplete correspondence between peoples and states. . . . The success and the stability of liberal democracy. . . never depends [*sic*] simply on the mechanical application of a certain set of universal principles and laws, but requires [*sic*] a degree of conformity between peoples and states [6].

This "degree of conformity between peoples and states" is the exception rather than the rule in contemporary international relations. This is because, in most of the world, the borders drawn between the states now existing were not arrived at by agreement among the people living there. Instead, these borders were established through conquest or other means, which did not consult the people in the region. Moreover, in much of the world, these undemocratically arrived at borders were not established by local powers, but by the European colonial empires instead. The borders that they drew, in particular, have resulted in a large number of conflicts: disputes between nations over territory that both claim, conflicts within nations in which regions seek to secede, and conflicts within nations in which the dominance of one ethnic group—which the colonial power often helped to create—has come under challenge from other groups.

Instead of promoting a peaceful system of international relations, then, the desire for democracy, which is spreading worldwide, is likely to lead to protracted conflict in much of the world. For, in much of the world, the desire for democracy confronts a formidable "legacy of empire" that has resulted in there being little conformity between peoples and

states. The desire for democracy has given rise to the desire to create conformity between peoples and states. The problem, however, is that different nations have very different ideas about what people belong in what state.

Many of the nationalist conflicts occurring now, of course, are not new. They existed as active or suppressed conflicts in the past. It will be argued here that during the period of the cold war, a set of circumstances existed which served to frustrate challenges to the legacy of empire throughout the world. In the post-cold war era, however, a very different set of circumstances has come into effect that gives much greater support to those forces challenging this legacy. The probability of alternative outcomes to these nationalist/democratic challenges to the legacy of empire will then be evaluated. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn concerning the implications of this problem for American and Western foreign policy. First, however, it is necessary to review the range of challenges to the legacy of empire that are occurring in various parts of the world, in order to understand how widespread and important this phenomenon is.

Challenges to the Legacy of Empire

The downfall of the USSR and the independence of its fifteen former republics in 1991 can be seen as the final chapter of a process that had begun much earlier: the downfall of all the European multiethnic colonial empires. This process began before the twentieth century, but was accelerated and has been virtually completed during it. The multiethnic colonial empires which have fallen (either completely or almost completely) are the Austro-Hungarian (1918), German (1918 and 1945), Dutch (1940s), British (1780s, 1920s–1990s, especially 1940s–1960s), French (1950s–1960s), Belgian (1960s), Spanish (1820s, 1898, and 1975), Portuguese (1820s, 1975), and Russian/Soviet (1989 and 1991). Of course, some non-European multiethnic colonial empires have also fallen, most notably the Ottoman Empire in 1918.

Over 100 new nations were born during this process of decolonization. Most of these new nations, however, were "unnatural" nations. Often, they did not exist at all as nations before colonization or conquest, or they did not exist in the past within their postcolonial borders. Some of those that did exist in the past were large or small empires themselves, in which one ethnic group dominated others. The modern borders between these new states were established either through conquest, struggles, and negotiations between empires, or simply by administrative fiat within an empire. This process took little or no account of whether the people living within these borders considered themselves to be a nation or not. And, in many instances, they do not.

Although anti-imperialist, the governments that came to power in these postcolonial states became upholders of the old colonial order in two important respects. First, virtually none of them has been willing to give up any territory to neighboring states or allow regional secession, despite the arbitrary nature of the borders they inherited from the colonial powers. Some postcolonial governments have challenged the inherited imperial order by demanding territory from their neighbors, but even these revisionist states (indeed, they especially) have been unwilling to acknowledge that others' claims to their territory may be as legitimate as their claims to the territory of others.

Second, in many instances, the postcolonial governments were or became replicas of the old colonial order, in the sense that one ethnic or other group came to dominate the entire country. Instead of that group coming from outside the country, as during the colonial era, it came from within the country after independence. This could occur through a leader coming to power (often via a coup) who is insecure and, hence, mainly appoints people from his region, tribe, or family to important posts in the belief that they will be more loyal allies.

But this phenomenon of one group dominating a country can also be directly inherited from the colonial era. The European powers frequently relied upon a particular

group within a colony (often a minority, which feared the majority and gained protection and authority through collaboration with the colonial power) to man the colony's army and maintain European rule. In some cases, these groups remained in control long after the departure of the European power.

Thus, while almost all of the countries that were colonies at the beginning of the twentieth century are now independent, a neocolonial or neoimperial order has been upheld in most of them through the preservation of artificial borders and/or the dominance of one ethnic or other group over the armed forces and the government. This legacy of empire, however, has in the past often come under challenge in many countries through attempts to alter borders between nations (often by force), to secede from an established state and create a new one, or to end the monopoly on power within a state held by one ethnic or other group. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, and growing demands for democracy, these challenges to the legacy of empire have increased dramatically throughout the world:

The Former USSR

There are numerous disagreements between the newly independent states about the borders that were drawn and often redrawn between them during the Soviet period. The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (a predominantly Armenian region located inside Azerbaijan) has degenerated into open warfare [7]. Other disagreements could also degenerate into conflict, such as the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, and disputes among the Central Asian republics over the highly convoluted borders drawn among them during the early years of Soviet power in the Fergana Valley [8]. There are many other territorial disputes as well [9].

In addition, just as the 15 former union republics seceded from the USSR, there are smaller units within several of these newly independent states that seek to secede from them and become independent themselves. Both Tatarstan (which possesses substantial petroleum reserves) and Chechen-Ingushetia have declared their independence from Russia [10]. The Muslim populations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are attempting to secede from predominantly Christian Georgia [11]. The Russian population on the east bank of the Dneister River wishes to secede from predominantly Romanian Moldova [12]. In each of these cases (as well as others), the ethnic group concentrated in these smaller regions does not trust the ethnically predominant group in the larger republic and hence wishes to secede. Also, in each of these cases, the ethnic group predominant in the larger republic has (so far) been unwilling to accept demands for regional independence as legitimate, even though these republics asserted their own right to independence from Moscow.

The Soviet Union has disappeared, but the 15 independent republics that used to comprise it have inherited a grim legacy of ethnic and nationalist tension from the Russian/Soviet empire.

East and Southeast Asia

Legacies from several empires remain in this region. China continues to be a colonial empire in the far western part of the country, where it rules over non-Chinese populations in Tibet and Xinjiang. Tibetans have continued to demand their independence, despite, or perhaps more accurately, because of, Chinese repression. Partly spurred by the example of Soviet Central Asia achieving its independence, the Muslims of Xinjiang have increasingly demanded their independence from China too. Spurred by democratization in independent Outer Mongolia, demands for political change have sprung up among the

Mongolians of Chinese Inner Mongolia, even though they are now a relatively small minority within this province [13].

The Philippines and Indonesia are both "nations" created by European colonialism; they did not exist as unified nations before colonization. In the Philippines, unification was imposed by the Spanish and maintained by the Americans; in Indonesia, it was imposed by the Dutch [14]. In both cases, the postcolonial governments sought to maintain this artificial unity, even though ethnic minorities, which form a majority on some islands, did not accept this. In the predominantly Catholic Philippines, the most notable case is the attempt at secession by predominantly Muslim Mindanao. In Javanese-dominated Indonesia, there have been attempts at secession on Sumatra, South Celebes, and elsewhere. The Indonesian government has not only preserved the empire created by the Dutch, but has expanded it by annexing Irian Jaya (Western New Guinea) and East Timor, despite the unwillingness of the local populations to become part of Indonesia. In neither the Philippines nor Indonesia have attempts at secession succeeded, nor have they been completely suppressed.

South Asia

The legacy of empire continues to affect South Asia, despite the fact that Britain retreated from the subcontinent in 1948. Before British rule, India existed either as an empire (in which one ethnic group ruled over many others), as a series of smaller states, or a combination of both. Even until the end of their rule, the British did not govern India as a unitary state; it ruled some parts of India directly, but in others it ruled only indirectly through princely governments. At independence, these princely governments were abolished [15].

Also at independence, British India was partitioned into largely Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. Both states, however, contained a variety of ethnic groups that had never voluntarily formed a state together. The unity of Muslim Pakistan collapsed with the secession of geographically discontinuous Bangladesh (East Pakistan) in 1971. Even what remains of Pakistan has not been free of ethnic strife [16].

There have been a number of persistent efforts to secede from India by several regions, including Kashmir, Punjab, and parts of India's far east (Assam). Secession movements may be growing in other regions, such as Tamil Nadu. In no case has India's Hindu majority been willing to allow regionally dominant minorities to secede by democratic means; indeed, a nationalist movement has sprung up which seeks to preserve a united, Hindu dominated India [17].

India's government is a democracy at the national level, but its constitution allows for the national government to dissolve democratically elected state governments and replace them with presidential rule. New Delhi has frequently done this in secessionist states [18]. The desire for independence held by regionally dominant minorities, however, cannot be dissolved as easily. Secessionist movements continue and have led to increasingly bitter conflict in some areas, especially Kashmir.

Elsewhere in South Asia, fighting is taking place on Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority over whether the Tamils should be allowed to secede and how much of the island they should be allowed to take with them if they do [19].

The Middle East

Most of the borders now in existence in the Middle East were drawn either during the era of the Ottoman Empire, or shortly after its collapse, by the European colonial powers

(Britain primarily, France secondarily) [20]. The Arab–Israeli conflict is partly a legacy of empire because different components of the British government made contradictory commitments to Jews and Arabs during World War I [21].

In addition, several borders drawn by one or more of the imperial powers have contributed to several modern conflicts. Disagreements about the precise location of the border between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, stemming back to at least the nineteenth century, was one of the causes of Baghdad's attack against Iran in 1980 which launched the Iran–Iraq war [22]. Iraqi nonrecognition of the existence of a border between Iraq and Kuwait, on the basis that no such border existed under the Ottomans but was created by Britain, was one of the causes of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait [23]. Morocco's claim to rule Western Sahara, on the basis that it did so before Spain occupied the territory, and POLISARIO's claim that the territory should be independent, caused the conflict which began between them when Spain withdrew from the territory in 1976 [24].

In addition to the Jews, the Middle East also contains an ethnic minority that forms a majority in certain regions and seeks to establish its own state: the Kurds, who are located in parts of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran [25]. There are also instances in which minorities rule over the majority: Sunnis in Iraq and Alawites in Syria [26]. The efforts of Syria to extend its influence throughout Lebanon can be seen as an effort by Damascus to destroy the French colonial legacy, which separated Lebanon from Syria [27].

The Arab world is also a region where there has been a significant pan-nationalist movement. Yet, despite the fact that the Arabs of every Arab country acknowledge themselves to be one nation and their governments have frequently called for Arab unity, the borders drawn in the years following World War I have remained substantially intact. This is because virtually none of the Arab regimes has been willing to surrender power to, or even share it with, any other one. The United Arab Republic, joining Egypt and Syria in the early 1960s, broke up because of the unwillingness of the Syrian army and bureaucracy to subordinate themselves to their Egyptian counterparts [28]. All of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi's unity projects also failed [29].

There have been only two examples of voluntary, successful unification of smaller Arab states into larger ones: the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. These, however, were special cases. The amalgamation of seven emirates into the UAE was largely engineered by the British [30]. In 1990, the South Yemeni leadership agreed to merge their country with more populous North Yemen and to accept a junior position in the new government because the most likely alternative it faced was to be completely overthrown, as so many other Marxist regimes were during that period [31].

Africa

The current borders among African states were mainly established by the European colonial powers at the Berlin Conference in 1885. Some border changes, though, were made in the ensuing decades by the colonial powers. Borders between European colonial empires reflected power relations among those powers; borders within the empires sometimes reflected interest group politics within the home country, or were drawn simply for administrative convenience. The European powers were not concerned with establishing borders that reflected or recognized African divisions and rivalries [32]. Consequently, as African states gained their independence, many of the new governments found that the borders they inherited artificially divided ethnic groups between two or more countries. In addition, many of them also found that within their borders were diverse ethnic groups, which, at best had little experience of cooperation with each other and, at worst, had a history of conflict between them.

Recognizing that the borders they inherited were a problem, the charter members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided that the European drawn borders would not be challenged for fear that endless conflict between African states would result

otherwise. This decision was unanimously approved and maintained by the OAU membership, with two exceptions: (1) Somalia's claim to territory inhabited by Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya; and (2) Morocco's claim to Western (former Spanish) Sahara [33].

This decision meant that the independent African governments committed themselves to maintaining the territorial status quo established by the Europeans. Indeed, they have been even more committed to maintaining the European established borders in Africa than the Europeans were. The colonial powers did alter them on several occasions, whereas independent African states generally have not.

As a result of upholding the OAU strictures against altering borders, Africa has been remarkably free of conflict between states over territorial issues. There have been a few such conflicts, but except for the 1977–1978 Somali-Ethiopian war, the conflict between Morocco and POLISARIO in Western Sahara, and conflict between Libya and Chad, most of them have not lasted long or involved much fighting [34]. Although maintaining the legacy of empire has resulted in relatively little interstate conflict in Africa, there has been a substantial amount of intrastate conflict. This conflict has been between different ethnic or tribal groups inside an artificially created country. They have either been over the attempt by one or more groups to secede from that state, or the struggle between ethnic groups to determine which one would dominate it.

Such conflicts include Biafra's attempt to secede from Nigeria in the 1960s, Eritrea's 30-year effort to gain independence from Ethiopia, the continuing effort of Cabinda to secede from Angola, and regional conflict within post-Mengistu Ethiopia. Some civil wars, which had an East-West element during the cold war, also involved conflicts between tribes or ethnic groups. The conflict in Angola, for example, is primarily a dispute between the Mbundu and mesticoes in the central part of the country and the Ovimbundu in the south. Both groups have sought to control the entire country.

Many of Africa's civil wars have persisted despite the end of the cold war, as in Angola, Sudan, and Mozambique (although the latter showed signs of coming to an end recently). Others have erupted or have greatly intensified after the end of the cold war, as in Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia. In addition to the black-white struggle in South Africa (which itself is definitely a legacy of empire), there is also growing tribal conflict between the Zulu dominated Inkatha and the nominally multiethnic African National Congress (ANC), which has a predominantly non-Zulu leadership [35].

Attempts at secession are obviously challenges to the European established order, but civil wars, in which different ethnic or tribal groups struggle over control of the state within its existing borders, may not appear to be such. The antagonists in these conflicts might not deliberately challenge the legacy of empire, but their combined actions often serve to do so. For in many of these conflicts, the opposing forces have come to occupy different parts of the country, thereby creating *de facto* states that are more ethnically homogenous than the *de jure* one they each claim a right to rule. Looked upon in this light, the legacy of empire has come under increasingly serious challenge in Africa since the end of the cold war.

Latin America

There are border disputes between several Latin American countries, but these are not being actively contested as in other parts of the world [36]. Latin America is also free of secessionist tendencies. The legacy of empire that Latin America suffers from is the often hostile relationship between the relatively wealthy Europeans (who inherited power after the end of direct rule from Spain or Portugal) and the relatively poor Indians and mestizos in several Latin American countries. The hostility between these two groups can be especially acute when the Europeans are a minority and have traditionally dominated a country's government, as in Peru.

Only 11% of Peru's population is European and yet this group has dominated Peru's governing institutions [37]. Although the rhetoric of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla group is Maoist and some of its leaders may be European, the movement's main support comes from the poor mestizo and Indian population. Sendero's primary goal is to destroy the European dominated government. Despite its ideological aspect, the civil war in Peru is actually an ethnic conflict between a dominant minority and a dominated majority that seeks to displace it [38].

Nor is it clear that Sendero recognizes the borders that European settlers drew between Latin American states after independence. If the guerrilla movement seizes power in Peru, it may then seek to spread its brand of revolution to neighboring countries. Sendero has reportedly expanded its activities to Bolivia already [39].

Elsewhere in Latin America, conflicts between haves and have nots also have an ethnic element: European vs. mestizo/Indian/other. This element is present in the persistent conflicts taking place in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and elsewhere. The 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's first voyage to the Americas has also served to heighten Indian consciousness about injustices suffered at the hands of the Europeans (this is not just true in Latin America, but North America as well) [40]. While most of Latin America has been independent for about 170 years, the legacy of empire is still very much present in this region.

Eastern Europe

The retreat of Soviet influence from Eastern Europe has meant that rival ethnic nationalisms have been freed to rise up in this region. The rivalry among these nationalisms has been sharpened by the legacy of several empires (Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian/Soviet), the legacy of their own small power imperialisms during the interwar period, and the redrawing of the borders following World War I and World War II [41]. In the short period since the retreat of Soviet control over the region in 1989, territorial disputes, attempts at secession, and the assertion of small power imperialisms have all arisen [42].

Severe conflict has arisen in former Yugoslavia. Unwilling to remain inside a federation that Serbia dominated, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia have all declared their independence. The Serbian government and militia in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have asserted the right of predominantly Serbian areas within these republics to secede and rejoin what is left of Yugoslavia [43]. Elsewhere, Slovakia has asserted its independence from what its leaders regarded as Czech dominated Czechoslovakia. Unlike the Serbs, though, the Czechs were willing to allow the peaceful breakup of their federation [44].

Western Europe

Despite the high degree of political and economic integration achieved by the European Community, Western Europe is not free from demands for secession by ethnic minorities. Many Catalans demand the independence of their region from Spain, which they insist Catalonia never voluntarily joined [45]. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland is also a legacy of empire. Although Protestants who want the province to remain united with Britain are in the majority, extremist Catholic elements insist that Protestants became the majority as the result of British imperialism in previous centuries [46]. There is also a growing movement in Scotland to restore that country's independence from England [47].

North America

The legacy of empire affects North America too. Britain's defeat of France in 1763 resulted in Britain acquiring Quebec. However, Quebec has remained a predominantly French speaking province. Popular demand within Quebec for secession from the rest of Canada is experiencing a strong revival [48].

Cold War and Post Cold War

From the above discussion, it is obvious that challenges to the legacy of empire in most parts of the world existed before the end of the cold war—some even since well before the beginning of it. The main difference between the cold war and the post-cold war eras may simply appear to be that now there is one less empire: the Russian/Soviet one. Why is there any reason to think that challenges to the legacy of empire in the post-cold war era will be any less unsuccessful than before, especially outside of the former USSR and Eastern Europe?

During the cold war period, only relatively few challenges to the legacy of empire succeeded. It was this era that witnessed extensive European decolonization. But although these newly independent states (as well as others) experienced attempts by regions to secede from them, almost none of those attempts succeeded. Bangladesh was the only significant exception, and it was unique: unlike most regions where attempts at secession have occurred, Bangladesh was geographically discontinuous from the rest of the country it seceded from [49].

Additionally, aside from decolonization, there have been relatively few territorial shifts in the post-cold war era. Most of those that did take place were small-scale exchanges of territory negotiated peacefully. Some territorial shifts did occur through force, but these were generally viewed as illegitimate both by the state losing the territory and by the international community as a whole [50].

Finally, although there have been innumerable coups and changes of government throughout the world during the cold war, very few destroyed the imperial legacy of a small, authoritarian group ruling over a large population without its consent. There were cases, of course, when a pro-Western government was ousted and replaced by a pro-Soviet one. Sometimes these changes also involved the political authority of one ethnic group being destroyed and replaced by another one. What this usually represented, though, was simply a state shifting from the American sphere of influence to the Soviet sphere through one dictatorship replacing another. The new regime was no more sympathetic to attempts at secession, demands for democratization, or attempts by nonruling ethnic groups to share power than the previous one.

The relative stability of the legacy of empire during the cold war, however, was not simply because the local forces challenging it were weak and the local forces upholding it were strong (though this was often the case). The policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union also served to uphold the legacy of empire during this period.

The United States generally supported the process of European decolonization after World War II. Fear of communist expansion, however, soon became the primary U.S. foreign policy concern. This fear led American foreign policy to oppose European decolonization in some instances, most notably with regard to the Portuguese colonial empire. Washington also supported a number of right-wing dictatorships, many of which were the instruments used by one ethnic or other group to maintain its dominance over the rest of the population in a particular country. Despite American support for democracy in general, foreign policymakers in Washington feared that democratization could not succeed in a country that had little or no experience of it. Washington also feared that the attempt to achieve democracy could result in the communists coming to power. The

certainty of keeping an unsavory but reliable ally in power was usually considered preferable to a process that would definitely unseat that ally and might possibly result in a complete loss of American influence.

In addition, American foreign policy during the cold war generally opposed secession. This was partly because of fear of communism; movements seeking regional secession from states allied to Washington were often, in the cold war context, seen as probable allies of Moscow. This, of course, was not the only motivation for America's position on this issue. The United States also opposed secession when other governments in the surrounding area opposed it. For example, the United States has opposed secession in Africa for fear of alienating the antiseccessionist governments of the OAU, virtually all of which, as discussed earlier, have been committed to maintaining the legacy of empire in Africa since the foundation of the OAU.

The Soviet Union portrayed itself, and many in the West and elsewhere believed it to be, a revolutionary power dedicated to bringing change to the rest of the world. And the Soviet Union certainly did work to bring change to the third world through promoting Marxist revolution in many countries. But the Soviet Union was also a status quo power in two important respects. First, Moscow, not surprisingly, was unwilling to allow political change in the USSR, Eastern Europe, or those third world countries where pro-Soviet Marxist regimes had come to power. Second, although Moscow did seek to change governmental policy or change the government itself in many states, the Soviets for the most part did not support demands for altering borders or secession. Moscow sought change, but change only within the existing pattern of states created by the legacy of empire.

Moscow's preference for co-opting the legacy of empire to its purposes instead of challenging it was especially evident in Soviet policy toward secessionist movements in the third world. In her painstaking research on Soviet support for revolutionary groups in Asia and Africa, Galia Golan showed that, although Moscow gave significant assistance to anticolonial or other movements seeking to liberate an entire country, it gave little or no support to groups seeking secession. Indeed, Moscow not only indicated its political opposition to many of these movements, but actually gave military assistance to governments (including non-Marxist ones) in order to suppress some of them. Moscow did give some support to Kurdish rebels seeking secession from Iraq and Eritrean rebels seeking secession from Ethiopia, but in both cases Moscow switched to helping suppress these movements after pro-Soviet regimes came to power in Baghdad and Addis Ababa. In these two cases, then, Moscow's aid for secessionists was not designed to help them achieve their goals, but merely to weaken the anti-Soviet regimes they were fighting against [51].

There were only two regionally based rebel movements that Moscow was especially supportive of: Bangladesh (Moscow only supported Bengali secession from Pakistan after India, the USSR's most important non-Marxist third world ally, did so) and Dhofar (a province of Oman). In the latter case, however, significant Soviet support did not begin until the rebellion in Dhofar was transformed from an attempt to achieve regional secession into a full-fledged national liberation movement that sought to overthrow the pro-Western Sultan of Oman and install a Marxist regime throughout the country [52].

During the cold war era, then, both superpowers generally opposed challenges to the legacy of empire, especially with regard to the question of secession. The typical situation that secessionists faced was that one superpower gave military assistance to the regime trying to suppress it while the other gave little or, more likely, nothing to the secessionists. Secessionists were sometimes able to obtain external support from regional powers. Often, however, the only arms they obtained were the ones they captured from the government they were fighting against. It should not be surprising, then, that attempts at secession were so unsuccessful during the cold war era.

In retrospect, the Soviet Union's motive for not wanting to challenge the legacy of empire in other parts of the world seems evident: the Kremlin did not want to set a

precedent that would legitimize secession from states in the Soviet orbit or, of course, from the USSR itself. Ultimately, however, the Soviet leadership was unable to prevent the dissolution of the USSR and the independence of all the non-Russian union republics that Moscow had previously ruled. This huge burst of secession and democratization—which has been recognized both by Moscow and by the international community generally—has provided numerous examples for challengers to the legacy of empire, both in the former USSR and throughout the world, to emulate.

Yet, however much of a demonstration effect it might have, the example of successful secession from the former USSR obviously provides no guarantee that attempts at secession will succeed elsewhere (including elsewhere in the former USSR). There are, though, other important changes in the post-cold war era that seem likely to increase the prospects for secessionists and others challenging the legacy of empire to achieve their goals.

One important change is that, having peacefully given up the Soviet empire, Russia is no longer willing to defend the legacy of empire in more distant parts of the world. This is not because Moscow has lost the capacity to do so. After all, Russia still possesses vast stockpiles of weapons that it does not need and could give away if it wanted to. But Russia's new leaders do not want to do this: such a policy would collide with their primary foreign policy objective of maintaining good relations with the West so that the West will continue to assist Russia economically [53]. Moscow withdrew from Eastern Europe in 1989 and has abandoned its former third world allies.

Russia has not completely ended its efforts to defend the legacy of empire in other parts of the world. Moscow has a commercial interest in selling weapons for hard currency to governments that can afford to pay for them [54]. More ominously, conservatives in the Russian parliament and press have become increasingly vocal in denouncing Western actions against Serbia. They fear that this could be used as a precedent against Moscow if it tried to prevent secession of republics from Russia [55]. Although the Russian Parliament opposes secession of autonomous republics from Russia, it refused, however, to sanction the use of force to restore Moscow's rule in secessionist Chechen-Ingushetia [56]. Russia's commitment to vigorously defending the legacy in Russia itself is unclear.

Another important change is that the United States no longer fears that secession or other challenges to the legacy of empire will, if successful, redound to the benefit of a hostile USSR. Challenges to the legacy of empire are now seen as having only local or, at most, regional effects. Although the United States may not support secession or other challenges to the legacy of empire, it is unlikely to have a compelling reason to oppose them either. Assuming it wanted to, the executive branch could find it extremely difficult to convince Congress and the public to support military involvement to protect the existing order. Absent a global or a strong regional threat to U.S. interests in the post-cold war era, the American public is unlikely to see defending the legacy of empire as being vital or even important to American interests [57]. For similar reasons, America's principal Western allies are also unlikely to make vigorous efforts to defend the legacy of empire.

What this means is that secessionists and others challenging the legacy of empire face a very different set of circumstances in the post-cold war era than they did during the cold war. These challengers may be no more likely to receive outside military assistance now than previously. But the defenders of the legacy are now far less likely to obtain military assistance from the great powers—unless they can afford to purchase it with hard currency. This means that the military balance between challengers and defenders is likely to be much less unequal in the post-cold war era than during the cold war. Although it will still be difficult for challengers to achieve victory, it is likely to be increasingly difficult for defenders to defeat them.

Alternative Outcomes

Defenders of the legacy of empire may no longer be in as favorable a position in the post-cold war era to protect the status quo as they were previously, but this does not mean that the forces challenging it will automatically succeed either. Aside from continuing on indefinitely, there are three alternative outcomes to challenges to the legacy of empire (which can be either violent or nonviolent) involving attempts at secession, in which a region seeks either to become independent or to join a neighboring nation, or a struggle for power between dominant and nondominant ethnic or other groups within a country. The alternative outcomes are: (1) the voluntary development of a peaceful, tolerant society within a state's existing borders in which ethnic or other distinctions become unimportant; (2) the maintenance of the status quo by force; and (3) the breakdown of the existing order within a state, or the breakdown of an existing state into ethnically more homogenous states.

It is far beyond the scope of this study to predict which of these three outcomes is most likely to occur in any of the large number of instances in which the legacy of empire is being challenged. Instead, the conditions under which each of these alternative outcomes might occur will be analyzed.

Creating a Voluntary Multiethnic State

The emergence of a single national consciousness among people with different ethnolinguistic backgrounds is not impossible. Nor has this only occurred in the United States, where most of the population traces its roots to other countries. At the outset of the French revolution in 1789, half the population of France did not speak French at all. At the time of Italian unification in 1860, a mere 2.5% of Italy's population spoke Italian for everyday purposes [58]. Yet, despite these seemingly unpromising beginnings, there is little doubt now that the overwhelming majority of the population of France regards itself as French and the population of Italy sees itself as Italian.

The process by which people of the different regions of these two countries became integrated into a larger nation did not take place instantaneously, but it did occur over a relatively short period of time historically. Can such a process of voluntary integration occur now in states created by the legacy of empire that include disparate ethnic groups who often speak different languages?

It is possible that this process will succeed elsewhere, but it will be fraught with difficulty. As democratization took place in Western Europe, the ethnically dominant majority, which was often extremely nationalistic, saw no contradiction between democracy and ruling over regions or overseas colonies without the consent of the people living there [59]. As democratization advanced in the twentieth century, however, such notions became discredited [60].

Regarding overseas colonies, the contradiction of a democratic nation ruling over another nation against the latter's will was resolved through decolonization. By contrast, ethnically distinct regions within Europe were usually not permitted the opportunity to secede, but were more fully integrated into the larger nation as democratization proceeded. By now, these groups within the European Community (EC) are fully protected by a common European code of human rights. Ethnic minorities, like other citizens of EC states, can appeal to the European Commission on Human Rights if they believe that their rights have been violated by their own governments. Yet, even under these circumstances, where the rights of regionally dominant ethnic minorities are maximally protected, there are groups within Western European countries which seek independence for their particular region.

If there are strong movements for independence among regionally dominant ethnic minorities in Western Europe, where conditions for their voluntary integration into the larger nation are relatively good, it should come as no surprise that regionally dominant minorities elsewhere are seeking independence from countries where their rights are not well protected, or not protected at all. The ethnically dominant groups in many democratizing countries of Africa, Asia, and the former USSR, however, appear to be at a similar stage in their political thinking as European publics were in the nineteenth century: they see themselves as possessing an unquestionable right to rule over regions where different ethnic groups form the majority.

At present, however, when both the desire for democracy and ethnic consciousness are at a high level in so many parts of the world, it will be difficult to persuade a regionally dominant ethnic minority to voluntarily adhere to a larger nation, if the former perceives that its rights are not respected by the latter. The integration of minorities into a nation can be a time consuming process even under the best of circumstances. But, where ethnic minorities dominate particular regions, ethnic consciousness and the desire for democracy may combine to demand independence immediately before the long process of integration into a voluntary nation can be completed or even begin.

Nineteenth century notions of democracy did not acknowledge rights of secession. Twenty first century ideas of democracy, however, cannot ignore this demand, especially after the examples of internationally recognized secession from both the USSR and Yugoslavia. What this means, then, is that powerful secessionist movements in democratizing states may not allow the central government the time necessary to encourage the voluntary evolution of a multiethnic state. Under these circumstances, central governments will be confronted with a choice between attempting to protect the legacy of empire by force or allowing that legacy to be destroyed by permitting regional secession.

Maintaining the Legacy of Empire by Force

Many states, of course, are not inclined to permit secession or any other change in the imperial legacy they inherited. In order to do this, though, the predominant group within a state must be willing and able to suppress the dissatisfied nondominant groups by force. Where these dissatisfied groups are the predominant population within specific regions or in the nation as a whole, it is doubtful that a quick, easy victory over them can be attained. Continuous, long-term use of force may be required to prevent them from achieving their goals.

This, however, may be an increasingly difficult task to accomplish in the post-cold war era. The use of force against secessionists is unlikely to encourage them, or others challenging the legacy of empire, to voluntarily integrate into the state with those using force against them. In addition, the continual use of force may be difficult for the predominant group to sustain if that group also values democracy. Important segments of the predominant group may realize the contradiction between their democratic values and suppressing the aspirations of nondominant groups by force. Whether this realization becomes widespread or not, however, a majority within the predominant group may simply become unwilling to bear the mounting human and monetary costs, as well as international isolation, that continuous suppression of the nondominant group entails. While the benefit of undertaking this effort may have seemed obvious at one point, over time a majority within the predominant group may conclude that the cost of suppressing the nondominant group(s) greatly exceeds the benefit of doing so. When this occurs in a democracy, the government will have little choice but to bring an end to its effort to maintain the legacy of empire by force.

Of course, not all governments defending the legacy of empire are democracies. Yet, dictatorships may not necessarily be in a better position to maintain the legacy of empire

by force in the post-cold war era either. Dictatorships persist, but the demand for democracy has spread. The example of successful secession from the USSR, which was reputedly the world's strongest dictatorship, may well encourage forces challenging the legacy of empire being defended by other dictatorships. By their very nature, dictatorships are unlikely to grant to secessionists the freedom they are unwilling to grant to the bulk of their population. Indeed, dictatorships are likely to see suppression of any challenge to the legacy of empire not only as being a worthwhile goal in and of itself, but also as crucial for maintaining their authority over the entire state. Permitting secession might lead the bulk of the population to conclude that the regime had become weak and encourage the dictatorship's opponents to overthrow it.

Attempting to suppress forces challenging the legacy of empire may involve more problems for a dictatorship than for a democracy, however. A prolonged, costly effort that fails to suppress secessionists or other opposition forces can lead not only to rising opposition within the rest of the country to a policy that the public does not regard as cost effective, but also to rising opposition to the dictatorial regime that pursues it. Domestic opposition to the Portuguese dictatorship during the first half of the 1970s, for example, was stimulated by growing opposition to the increasingly costly but fruitless task of attempting to suppress independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

The most promising course of action for any government seeking to preserve the legacy of empire by force is to defeat secessionists and other opposition forces as quickly as possible. But this may be increasingly difficult during an era, as was mentioned before, when massive military assistance from the great powers is no longer available to support such an effort.

The Breakdown of the Legacy of Empire

The breakdown of the legacy of empire, especially the proliferation of ethnically more homogenous nations through secession, is often seen as unlikely or difficult to bring about [61]. Yet, if artificially created multiethnic states cannot be held together either voluntarily or involuntarily, then the breakdown of the legacy of empire may be the most likely outcome to ethnic conflict within states in the post-cold war era. And this outcome is increasingly likely in the present era because: (1) the predominant group within a democracy or a dictatorship may become unwilling to bear the burden of preventing nondominant groups from achieving their goals in the long run; and (2) the costs to governments attempting to maintain the legacy of empire are likely to reach unacceptably painful levels more quickly in an era when they are far less likely to receive external military assistance.

Some observers recognize the existence of this trend toward the creation of a large number of smaller nations, but see it only as a temporary phenomenon. They argue that even if smaller nations succeed in gaining their independence, they will not want to keep it because smaller states are economically less viable than larger ones. Nationalism is an emotional demand. Once it has been fulfilled, harsh economic reality will lead to the realization that being part of a larger nation can better ensure prosperity than does being a small independent state [62].

It is possible that this can happen. But the logic of this "economic rationalist" argument is suspect on several counts. First, part of the motivation for those seeking secession is often the perception that the predominant nationality has exploited them economically and caused them to be poor. Independence may not lead to prosperity, but nationalists are unlikely to be convinced that rejoining a state, which they feel oppressed them in the past, will lead to prosperity in the future. Second, the argument assumes that small nations cannot be prosperous. Yet, there are many examples of small states that are prosperous and large nations that are not. A state's size in terms of territory or population

and its degree of prosperity are not necessarily related. Third, the argument assumes that independent nations cannot cooperate with one another effectively. And yet there are more and more examples of successful international economic cooperation occurring. Fourth, a relatively small nation can exercise greater control over the terms of its economic interaction with others as an independent state than as a region within a larger state.

Fifth, and most important, the economic rationalist logic, which argues that small nations will eventually conclude that independence is undesirable, is not supported by historical experience. Many states in Africa and Asia which achieved their independence during the mid-twentieth century are economically worse off now than they were as colonies. Yet, none of them has offered to surrender its independence to the former colonial power, or any other state, for the sake of a higher standard of living. Nor are any of them likely to do so; they value their independence too highly. Indeed, there is only one case during the twentieth century of an independent state voluntarily returning to colonial status and/or voluntarily becoming part of a larger nation for economic reasons: Newfoundland [63].

The fact that one state did surrender its independence voluntarily demonstrates that others could do so. But, the fact that only one has done this in recent history indicates that few others can be expected to do so in the future. If this is true, then those new nations that come into existence as a result of the destruction of the legacy of empire are likely to preserve their independence jealously no matter how dire their economic straits may become, just as former European colonies in Africa and Asia have done.

Conclusion

The destruction of the legacy of empire is not likely to lead to a stable or peaceful new world order. As small nations become independent, even smaller ones within them may demand independence too. In addition, antagonistic ethnic groups within a single state created by the legacy of empire do not necessarily live neatly in separate regions. Secession will not necessarily lead to an end to strife in such countries. Finally, as the number of independent states proliferate, the potential for border disputes also increases. The destruction of the legacy of empire may lead to the outbreak of many new conflicts, or the reemergence of old ones.

How should America and the West react to this problem? Where do our interests lie? Although no one conflict in the post-cold war era may vitally affect the interests of the West, the sheer volume of conflicts that might occur could lead to much of the world becoming engulfed in war. In addition to being a tragedy for the people involved, this could also result in those areas becoming less amenable to Western efforts to maintain stability. Under these circumstances, America and its allies might be hard pressed to avoid being negatively affected themselves through an enormous increase in refugee flows to the West [64]. The problems resulting from the legacy of empire, then, are not ones the West can afford to ignore.

If, as has been argued here, maintaining the legacy of empire by force and promoting the voluntary creation of multiethnic states are both unlikely to succeed, then the most promising strategy available to the West may be to promote the peaceful dismantling of the legacy of empire through supporting secessionist efforts which enjoy strong popular support in their regions.

This may appear to be a highly risky policy prescription. The ultimate shape of an international order in which secession becomes an accepted norm is highly uncertain, except that the probability of conflict in it seems high. This is undeniable. Yet, attempting to maintain the legacy of empire will certainly lead to a high degree of conflict, too, because it will not mean that conflict between ethnic and other groups will not occur.

Assisting the breakup of the legacy of empire, though, ultimately holds out the prospect for a more peaceful international order than attempting to maintain the legacy of empire. Fukuyama and many others have observed that international relations among democracies tend to be peaceful. Democracies do not go to war with each other, though they do go to war with dictatorships. And, of course, dictatorships go to war with each other. If this theory is valid, then a peaceful international order is more likely to occur the more widespread democracy becomes. But democratization and maintenance of the legacy of empire voluntarily are mutually incompatible goals in many nations. In these cases, the legacy of empire can only be maintained by the use of force. Democracy and peaceful international relations cannot take root under these circumstances.

On the other hand, allowing the legacy of empire to be altered through secession can, using Fukuyama's terminology, lead to the creation of the more complete "correspondence between peoples and states" that is necessary for democracy to develop and flourish. And, although some of the newly democratizing nations have displayed a tendency to become involved in conflict, ultimately it is the long-term trend for mature democracies to shun conflict with one another that is the best hope for establishing a peaceful international order. The more mature democracies there are, the more peaceful international relations are likely to become. But as long as that legacy of empire remains, which prevents the complete correspondence between peoples and states, it is unlikely that democracies will develop and mature, or that international relations will become peaceful.

Notes

1. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), chs. 23–24. See also Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (1986): 1151–69; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (1989): 3–35; and David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* 86 (1992): 24–37.

2. For example, in President George Bush's address to the nation on September 27, 1991, he justified unilateral American reductions in its nuclear weapons arsenal by referring to the end of "the fear that preoccupied us for 40 years—the prospect of a global confrontation." He also stated, "The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with little or no warning, is no longer a realistic threat." President Bush, "New Initiatives to Reduce U.S. Nuclear Forces," U.S. Department of State *Dispatch*, Sept. 30, 1991, p. 715.

3. Fukuyama, *End of History*, ch. 4.

4. See, for example, John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, "Democratization and Islam," *The Middle East Journal* 45 (1991): 427–40.

5. Fukuyama argues that those states that have not made the transition to democracy are likely to be engaged in conflict in relation to their "stage of development." Although China remains a dictatorship, its leadership recognizes that China's prosperity depends on cooperation with the West. Fukuyama, *End of History*, pp. 276–7. John Mueller described "the contagion of war-aversion" as spreading among dictatorships as well as democracies. He saw this aversion as having spread throughout the developed world (including the USSR and China) and likely to sweep through the third world as well. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), chs. 10–11.

6. Fukuyama, *End of History*, pp. 212–13.

7. Elizabeth Fuller, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Internal Conflict Becomes International," *RFE/RL Research Report*, March 13, 1992, pp. 1–5.

8. Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation over the Crimea," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Feb. 21, 1992, pp. 26–30; and Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1992, p. 112.

9. For a useful map detailing the ethnic and nationalist territorial claims within the former USSR, see Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, "Ethnicity and Political Boundaries in the Soviet Union," March 1990.

10. Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Chechen-Ingushetia," *Report on the USSR*, Nov. 15, 1991, pp. 20-26; and *idem*, "Tatarstan Asserts Its Sovereignty," *RFE/RL Research Report*, April 3, 1992, pp. 1-4. See also Marc Ferro, "La Russie, a son tour, Menacee de Demembrement?" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Oct. 1991, pp. 4-5.

11. Elizabeth Fuller, "South Ossetia: Analysis of a Permanent Crisis," *Report on the USSR*, Feb. 15, 1991, pp. 20-22; and "Guerrilla War Looms in West Georgia," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 20, 1992.

12. Vladimir Socor, "Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova," *RFE/RL Research Report*, January 17, 1992, pp. 8-13; and Suzanne Crow, "Russian Moderates Walk a Tightrope on Moldova," *RFE/RL Research Report*, May 15, 1992, pp. 9-12.

13. June Teufel Dreyer, "Unrest in Tibet," *Current History*, Sept. 1989, pp. 281-84, 288-89; Lena H. Sun, "China Fears that Fever of Soviet Ethnic Conflicts Could Cross Border," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 20, 1991; and Nicholas D. Kristof, "Restlessness Reaches Mongols in China," *The New York Times*, July 19, 1992. Beijing has also warned that it "will not sit idly by and remain indifferent" to efforts by Taiwanese nationalists to declare their island independent from China. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Warns Taiwan's Independence Advocates," *The New York Times*, Oct. 16, 1991.

14. Nicholas Tarling, *A Concise History of Southeast Asia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 33-64, 80-9, 119-26, 158-77, 193-206.

15. Percival Spear, *India: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 378-79, 424-27.

16. W. Norman Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh* 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), ch. 11; and Ahmed Rashid, "No Law, No Order," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 24, 1991, p. 24.

17. Steve Coll, "Indian Democracy: Alive but Not Well," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 11, 1990; and *idem*, "India's Security Forces Assume New Power as Role in Ending Conflict Grows," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 2, 1990.

18. In early 1991, *The New York Times* reported that "nearly a fifth of Indian states are now without elected governments." Barbara Crossette, "New Delhi Ousts Government of a Big State," *The New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1991.

19. Robert C. Oberst, "A War without Winners in Sri Lanka," *Current History*, March 1991, pp. 128-31.

20. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), ch. 3; and Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 315-22.

21. Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), ch. 1.

22. Edmund Ghareeb, "The Roots of Crisis: Iraq and Iran," in Christopher C. Joyner, *The Persian Gulf War* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 21-38.

23. Michael B. Bishku, "Iraq's Claim to Kuwait: A Historical Overview," *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 37 (Summer 1991): 77-88.

24. Robert J. Bookmiller, "The Western Sahara: Future Prospects," *American-Arab Affairs*, no. 37 (Summer 1991): 64-6. In 1992, acute political conflict in Algeria between the government and the Islamist opposition resulted in military support to POLISARIO from Algeria being terminated. Because Algeria had been POLISARIO's principal arms supplier, the ability of POLISARIO to continue the conflict apparently ended. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Rebellion in Western Sahara Limp to a Halt," *The New York Times*, Aug. 16, 1992.

25. Lenczowski, *The Middle East*, pp. 98-106; William Linn Westermann, "Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1991 [excerpts from article originally published July 1946], pp. 50-4; and "Independence by Stealth," *The Economist*, May 9, 1992, pp. 43-4.

26. Hourani, *History of Arab Peoples*, p. 436; and Laurie Mylroie, "The Future of Iraq," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Policy Paper no. 24, 1991, pp. 15-17.

27. Lenczowski, *The Middle East*, pp. 314-26.

28. Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 21-5.

29. Mary-Jane Deeb, "Inter-Maghribi Relations Since 1969: A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers," *The Middle East Journal* 43 (1989): 20-33.

30. J. B. Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 58, 93.

31. Charles Dunbar, "The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects," *The Middle East Journal* 46 (1992): 456-76.

32. Donald L. Wiedner, *A History of Africa: South of the Sahara* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), *passim*.

33. Samuel G. Amoo, "The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis and Future Perspectives," George Mason University Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution Working Paper, May 1992, p. 12; and I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, updated ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 15.

34. For a listing of territorial conflicts in Africa, see Zartman, *loc. cit.* Libya's claim to the Aouzou strip in northern Chad was not a rejection of the legacy of empire, but emanated from a dispute over which colonial-era agreement concerning it is valid. The Libyan claim is based on a 1935 treaty between France and fascist Italy, which, the Libyan government argues, granted the strip to Libya. Although the claim was not recognized internationally, Libya occupied the strip in 1972. George Joffe, "Turmoil in Chad," *Current History*, April 1990, p. 160.

35. On Angola, see "War Again," *The Economist*, Jan. 16, 1993, pp. 43-4. On Ethiopia, see "Africa's Balkans," *The Economist*, June 27, 1992, pp. 44, 47. On Kenya, see "Mayhem, Maybe," *The Economist*, April 4, 1992, p. 54. On Liberia, see Christopher Clapham, "Liberia," in Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, *et al.*, eds., *Contemporary West African States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 99-112; and Michel Galy, "La guerre civile, loin de Monrovia," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, July 1990, p. 3. On Mozambique, see Virginia Curtin Knight, "Mozambique's Search for Stability," *Current History*, May 1991, pp. 217-20, 226; and "The Landscape After Battle," *The Economist*, Aug. 15, 1992, p. 31. On Nigeria, see Shehu Othman, "Nigeria: Power for Profit—Class, Corporatism and Factionalism in the Military," in O'Brien, *Contemporary West African States*, pp. 113-44; and "Seething," *The Economist*, May 23, 1992, p. 46. On Rwanda, see "Rwanda's Perpetual War," *The Economist*, June 6, 1992, p. 46. On Somalia, see Rakiya Omaar, "Somalia: At War with Itself," *Current History*, May 1992, pp. 230-34. On South Africa, see "A Normality All Its Own," *The Economist*, Feb. 15, 1992, pp. 48, 52. On Sudan, see Francis Mading Deng, "War of Visions for the Nation," *The Middle East Journal* 44 (1990): 596-609.

36. For a list of outstanding territorial disputes all over the world, see Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, *Territorial Changes and International Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 141-42.

37. Fukuyama, *End of History*, p. 216.

38. According to Miguel Angel Rodriguez Rivas, who had been a teacher and friend of Sendero leader Abimael Guzman, "Sendero is an ethnic, cultural movement...It recognizes that we are a fundamentally Indian republic with a fundamentally Indian outlook." Nicholas Shakespeare, "In Pursuit of Guzman," *The Best of Granta Travel* (London: Granta Books/Penguin, 1991), p. 246. See also David P. Werlich, "Fujimori and the 'Disaster' in Peru," *Current History*, February 1991, pp. 61-4, 81-3; and Eugene Robinson, "Peruvian Guerrilla Group Launches Urban 'Final Campaign,'" *The Washington Post*, April 21, 1992.

39. Gustavo Gorriti, "Peru's Dictatorship Is Ridiculous but Real," *The New York Times*, Aug. 24, 1992.

40. Maurice Lemoine, "Resistance indienne, noire et populaire," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Jan. 1992, p. 11; and Nathaniel C. Nash, "Latin American Indians: Old Ills, New Politics," *The New York Times*, Aug. 24, 1992.

41. The redrawing of the borders in Eastern Europe after World War II was a unilateral action undertaken by the USSR in order to establish its empire there. Stalin was not concerned with whether the people affected by this redrawing approved of them or not. See John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace* (New York: Norton, 1974), *passim*. After World War I, by contrast, a substantial effort was made at the Versailles peace conference to redraw borders according to the principle of national self-determination. The problem with the borders actually drawn by the victorious allies, however, was that they only incompletely reflected this principle, partly because the mixed ethnic nature of the region made adhering to this principle fully extremely difficult, if not completely impossible in many instances. Border disagreements among these new East European states were responsible for

much of the tension and conflict between them that occurred in the interwar era. See Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), pp. 124–31; and Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), *passim*.

42. For a survey of the actual and potential conflicts in this region, see J. F. Brown, "Crisis and Conflict in Eastern Europe," *RFE/RL Research Report*, May 29, 1992, pp. 1–9.

43. Patrick Moore, "Yugoslavia: Ethnic Tension Erupts into Civil War," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Jan. 3, 1992, pp. 68–73; and *idem*, "A New Phase in the Bosnian Crisis?" *RFE/RL Research Report*, July 31, 1992, pp. 1–7. Croatian militia forces have also seized territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

44. Jiri Pebe, "Czechoslovak Parliament Votes to Dissolve Federation," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Dec. 4, 1992, pp. 1–5.

45. Thierry Maliniak, "L'Espagne face a l'explosion des nationalismes," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Dec. 1991, p. 3.

46. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 135.

47. "John Major's Culloden?" *The Economist*, March 28, 1992, pp. 58–9.

48. Kenneth McRoberts, "Canada's Constitutional Crisis," *Current History*, Dec. 1991, pp. 411–16.

49. "Historically. . . secession is relatively uncommon, constituting less than 5 percent of the cases of territorial change since 1815. Even rarer have been the cases of secession involving military conflict since 1945. Only Bangladesh in recent memory was successful in breaking away by the use of military force, and then only with the assistance of India." Goertz and Diehl, *Territorial Changes*, p. 137.

50. "The most notable trend in the frequency of military conflict is a sharp decline in the proportion of violent territorial changes since 1950. . . . Not only are territorial transfers less likely then, but those that do occur are achieved peacefully." *Ibid*, p. 87.

51. Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 262–65, 275–83.

52. *Ibid*, pp. 283–6.

53. Stephen Sestanovich, "Inventing the Soviet National Interest," *The National Interest*, no. 20 (Summer 1990): 5–9; and Suzanne Crow, "Russia Debates Its National Interests," *RFE/RL Research Report*, July 10, 1992, pp. 43–6.

54. Fred Hiatt, "Russia Boosts Weapons Sales to Aid Economy," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 1992.

55. Suzanne Crow, "Russia's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis," *RFE/RL Research Report*, July 24, 1992, pp. 31–5.

56. Eleanor Randolph, "Yeltsin Eases Stand on Enclave," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 13, 1991.

57. Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 49–74.

58. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 60–1.

59. *Ibid*, ch. 4.

60. Fukuyama, *End of History*, pp. 257–8. See also David Strang, "Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500–1987," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (1991): 429–54.

61. "If the future follows the past, one might expect few cases of secession in the coming years." Goertz and Diehl, *Territorial Changes*, p. 137.

62. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 176–7; and Martha Brill Olcott, "A New, Improved USSR: Encouraging Regional Freedoms Can Make a Stronger Union," *The Washington Post* (Outlook), May 20, 1990.

63. Brian Hunter, ed., *The Statesman's Year-Book, 1991–1992* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 312; and John F. Burns, "Joseph R. Smallwood Dies at 90; Led Newfoundland into Canada," *The New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1991. There may be another example. Reportedly there is strong popular sentiment within Surinam (South America) to give up independence and invite Holland to resume responsibility for Surinam's finances, foreign affairs, and defense. Howard W. French, "New Ties to Dutch Tempt Surinamese," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1991.

64. Gil Loescher, "Refugee Movements and International Security," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 268 (London: IISS, 1992).