

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGNS IN THE 2016 US
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

by

Peter A. Susko
A Dissertation
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Communication

Committee:

_____ Dissertation Director

_____ Department Chair

_____ Dean, College of Humanities and Social
Sciences

Date: _____ Fall Semester 2020
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

A Content Analysis of the 2016 Presidential Candidates Social Media Campaigns

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

By

Peter A. Susko
Bachelor of Arts
University of Mary Washington, 2012
Master of Arts
George Mason University, 2014

Director: Gary Kreps, Professor
Department of Communication

Fall Semester 2020
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my late grandfather Daniel E. Wingerter.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my family, friends, and members of the faculty in the Department of Communication at George Mason. To my mother and my sister, Kathryn for giving hours of their time to help gather materials for my research. Dr. Kreps for his boundless positivity when I felt that this work would never get done. Dr. Cai and Dr. Lichter were invaluable on the formation of my methodology and research questions. Lastly, I would like to thank Dr. Decker who originally recruited me to become a graduate assistant at George Mason and coach the debate team.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.....	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	6
Role of Social Media in Political Campaigns	6
Study 1: Extended Parallel Process Model	13
EPPM and Political Campaigns	21
Study 2: Image Repair Theory	24
Entertainment-Education Communication.....	33
METHODOLOGY	41
Study 1: EPPM.....	41
Study 2: Image Repair	46
RESULTS	51
Study 1	51
Table 1. Severity Chi-Square Tests	52
Table 2. Susceptibility Chi-Square Tests.....	53
Table 3. Efficacy Chi-Square Tests	55
Study 2	56
Table 4. Clinton Image Repair Tactics Chi-Square Tests.....	57
Table 5. Trump Image Repair Tactics Chi-Square Tests.....	57
DISCUSSION	60
CONCLUSION.....	74
APPENDIX A.....	77
APPENDIX B	81
APPENDIX C	84
REFERENCES	87

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
Table 1. Severity Chi-Square Tests	50
Table 2. Susceptibility Chi-Square Tests	51
Table 3. Efficacy Chi-Square Tests	53
Table 4. Clinton Image Repair Tactics Chi-Square Tests	54
Table 5. Trump Image Repair Tactics Chi-Square Tests	55
Table 6. Trump Social Media Likes / Shares	57
Table 7 Clinton Social Media Likes / Shares	58

ABSTRACT

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGNS

Peter A. Susko, Ph. D

George Mason University, 2020

Dissertation Director: Dr. Gary L. Kreps

This dissertation analyzed the social media posts of the 2016 United States presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Study one, utilizing the Extended Parallel Process Model, looked at the different fear appeal tactics in the candidates' social media posts. Study two, using the Image Repair Theory, isolated instances where both candidates went through a crisis and analyzed their responses on social media. This author found that both candidates used various tactics under the fear appeal model. The author did not find conclusive evidence on image repair tactics used via social media. This dissertation is the first application of EPPM in a political communication context. The dissertation also adds onto the rich background of Image Repair Theory, bringing the theory into the age of social media.

INTRODUCTION

Politicians have historically attempted to use technological communication innovations to influence public opinion and to win elections. From the advent of newspapers in the mid-19th century (Sverson, Kioussis, & Stromback, 2015) to FDR's fireside chats on the radio (Hendricks & Schill, 2015), politicians have used the media to sway the masses. With each innovation, the formula has been updated with a relatively small number of changes. Innovations in the media have created advancements in efficiency and distribution, but until recently the media were used primarily for one-way communication (Gainous & Wagner, 2014). Social media has changed the political landscape irreversibly; media is now easily accessible, interactive, and can create mass, multidirectional conversations.

Presidential political campaigns are adapting to the new environment of social media, with trial and error in campaigns. What started with early experiments from McCain's 2000 Internet campaign (Towner & Tulio, 2011) and Howard Dean's 2004 blog, a consistent and robust social media campaign is now required for successful political campaigns. The rise of social media has a platform for political campaigns coincided with the tenure of the Obama administration. Obama was helped in winning his initial presidential bid and reelection by his strategic use of social media. During the 2008 election, the Obama team raised \$430 million with the use of social media (Scherer,

2012). The Trump campaign was also able to take advantage of using social media to win the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump used social media more prominently than his democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton, with Trump gathering 4 million more Twitter followers than Clinton and sparking more interest than Clinton's social media platforms (Khan, 2016).

Social media is now becoming a staple for how voters evaluate political campaigns. People in increasing numbers are using social media to seek out political news and share their opinions (Rainie & Smith, 2012; Sweetser & Lariscy, 2008). In leading up to the 2012 election, there were over 500 million users on Twitter (Semiocast, 2012) and 1 billion Facebook users (Facebook, 2013). In 2016, 29.2% of U.S. social media users are Twitter users (Smith, 2016), half of Americans used Facebook at least once, and there were 89.4 million Instagram users (eMarketer, 2016). As more of the public continues to use social media platforms, it is imperative that more research is conducted to evaluate politician's use of social media for political campaigns. This dissertation conducted two content analyses of Donald Trump's and Hilary Clinton's social media campaigns during the 2016 presidential election. The two guiding theories for this study are Witte's extended parallel process model (EPPM) and Benoit's image repair theory.

Presidential campaigns have to decide between multiple tactics when conducting a campaign. A presidential campaign needs to decide the way the candidate will respond to their opponent, the nature of the media coverage, as well as take in mind the predisposition of the viewer (West, 2017). Campaigns will decide tactics based on

favorability (how likeable the candidate), electability (how likely the candidate is going to win the election), and familiarity (how much the voter knows about the candidate) (2017). Campaigns also need to choose what topics the candidate will be talking about as well as whether they are going to lean in on the experience of the candidate (Campbell & Dettrey, 2009; Ryoo, Bendle, & Burgoyne, 2017).

When deciding what tactics to use, a large decision in for candidates entering a campaign is whether to go positive or negative. A candidate can speak only about her/his positive attributes and ignore attacking his/her opponent. Another strategy is to go on the offensive, using threat appeals to scare the voters away from his/her opponent. Threat appeals have been a staple of political campaigns for years. From Lyndon B. Johnson's Daisy ad, where a little girl was plucking a daisy while a nuclear launch countdown played in the background, to George H.W. Bush's Revolving Door ad of Michael Dukakis, where a revolving door was shown of convicts being given furlough after Willie Horton, a man committed for murder, then committed assault, armed robbery, and rape while on furlough. Fear has the ability to stimulate constructive action to deal with a threat, such as donating, voting, or volunteering (Gray, 1987; LeDoux, 1996). Fear appeals also have the ability to promote withdrawal or inaction, encouraging people to abstain from voting in the election (1996). Witte's extended parallel process model (EPPM) was created to explain why some fear appeals work, while others fail. The model has been empirically tested to show effective fear appeal messages need to have four components: severity, susceptibility, response efficacy, and self-efficacy. EPPM was chosen as the fear appeal model, as it is an improvement on previous fear appeal models.

The model was created to integrate past models and show what tactics are needed in order for successful behavior change to occur. The first phase of this dissertation conducts a content analysis of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton's social media posts to evaluate the use of fear appeal components in his social media posts.

Another large component of political campaigns include politician's abilities to respond effectively to numerous crises during the election cycle. From Clinton's Benghazi hearings and the related FBI report, to Trump's sexual assault allegations, candidates need to respond to many serious allegations. Benoit's image repair theory outlines strategies politicians can use to respond to allegations to help repair his/her image. The theory states there are five strategies political campaigns can employ: denying, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. The theory was chosen due to its focus on apologia; a formal defense or justification of an individual's opinion, position, or actions (Benoit, 2015). The theory has been applied to numerous political scandals, such as Reagan's messages on the Iran-contra affair (Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991), Newt Gingrich's book deal while he was Speaker of the House (Kennedy & Benoit, 1997), and George W. Bush's statement about weapons of mass destruction (Benoit, 2006). The empirical testing of Benoit's image repair theory allows for proven tactics that can be used to guide hypotheses and research questions. Previous studies have conducted content analyses of press conferences, interviews, and press releases to examine image repair communication strategies. The current study examines Donald Trump's social media posts in response to a crisis during

the 2016 election cycle. The content analysis explored the image repair tactics employed by Trump on his social media platforms (specifically, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram).

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Role of Social Media in Political Campaigns

Presidential candidates have empirically utilized innovations in media technology to their favor. One of the earliest example of this was with newspapers in the mid-19th century (Sverson, Kioussis, & Stromback, 2015). From FDR's fireside chats on the radio to JFK's use of television (Hendricks & Schill, 2015), presidential candidates have used innovations to reach the masses. Previous media innovations have followed a pattern; either increasing efficiency or distribution of the message (Gainous & Wagner, 2014). Social media has created innovations that go beyond efficiency and distribution, providing a platform for two-way communication that has not existed previously. This section will provide an overview of previous presidential political campaigns that have used social media, the differences between digital media and its predecessors, the ways people use social media in politics, and lastly an overview of specific platforms that have been used by political campaigns.

Prior to the 2008 presidential election, candidates did not have a coherent social media strategy (Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2013; Lassen & Brown, 2011). Presidential campaigns would experiment with social media sites but did not have a consistent message nor a dedicated team in order to make it successful. Use of social media was

sparsely used. John McCain's 2000 presidential campaign was credited with the first use of the Internet (Towner & Dulio, 2011). Howard Dean had the first success with digital media, using his blog to raise funds for his campaign (Painter, Fernandes, Mahone, & Al Nashmi, 2015). YouTube and MySpace were among the first social media platforms used by candidates (Gueorguieva, 2008).

The 2008 election saw a significant shift in the way political campaigns used social media (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011). At the time, the social network sites (SNS) Facebook and Twitter were gathering large audiences. In 2008, 44% of adults in America were on the Internet (Williams & Serge, 2011). Also, 22% used Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace (Carlisle & Patton, 2013). Major news sources began to utilize SNSs. For example, CNN used YouTube to generate questions for the presidential debate they hosted (Brubaker, 2011). Users posted 30 second questions that had the chance to be asked in the presidential debate. The 2008 Obama campaign was the first presidential campaign to fully utilize social media's potential to its advantage. The Obama campaign used Twitter to disseminate information about the campaign (Ancu, 2011). Obama "outweeted" his opponent John McCain on a ratio of 24 to 1 (Abroms & Lefebvre, 2009). The campaign information included announcing future appearances and showing ways to mobilize support.

The social media advantage provided the Obama campaign with a financial benefit totaling \$430 million from social media posts (Scherer, 2012). The campaign also

used other social media tools to a smaller extent; such as YouTube, MySpace, Flickr, and SecondLife (Williams & Serge, 2011). The Obama campaign was able to reach a large audience with an email list of 13 million people (Yun, Opheim, & Hanks, 2014). While the 2008 Obama social media campaign helped President Obama greatly, the campaign had a few errors. Early use of social media was only for dissemination of information and did not discuss policy issues or create interactive dialogue with voters. Campaigns could have been using these platforms to discuss policy issues and keep voters up to date with the policies advocated by the candidates.

The 2012 election saw the expansion of social media use in political campaigns. Leading up to the 2012 election, there were over 500 million users on Twitter (SemioCast, 2012) and 1 billion Facebook users (Facebook, 2013). The Romney campaign studied the gap from 2008 and sought to close it. Both presidential campaigns used various SNSs, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (Williams & Maiorescu, 2015). The increase in social media use was a necessity, as the American public increased its social media use. 54% of SNSs users used the Internet to learn campaign information, and a small portion of the public (5%) signed up to receive texts from the candidates (2015). Twitter and Facebook continued to be the dominant platforms used; with 66% of social media users using it for political information and to find civic activities (Schill & Kirk, 2015; Williams & Maiorescu, 2015). The Obama campaign once again found ways to outmaneuver the Romney campaign on social media in new and innovative ways. For example, Obama had an ask-me-anything (AMA) on the social news discussion website Reddit (Hendricks & Schill, 2015). The Obama campaign also developed a donation app

for smart phones (2015). On YouTube, another distinction was made, with Obama using the service more than Romney. For example, Obama had a documentary on his YouTube channel that detailed the campaign trail (Schill & Kirk, 2015).

The gains from the social media campaign were evident; with President Obama being able to raise \$690 million during the 2012 campaign through digital communication (Scherer, 2012). Obama gained this advantage through having more followers; on Twitter Obama had twenty million followers to Romney's 1.2 million (McHugh, 2012). Candidates continued to use SNSs to self-promote and disseminate campaign information. Twitter continued to be the dominant platform and was used in a similar function to the 2008 platform, providing users with information on upcoming events (Adams & McCorkindale, 2013). Social media campaigns continued to not utilize the interactive capabilities of SNS.

In the 2016 presidential campaign between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, the candidates benefited from the maturity of SNSs. A 2016 Pew Research Center poll found close to 80% of adults are on Facebook, with 24% of adults using Twitter (Greenwood, Perrin, & Duggan, 2016). Today, there are a plethora of options for people to consume media on the Internet today; such as online news sites, political candidates' websites, traditional blogs, microblogging (Twitter), and SNSs (Facebook, Tumblr, and Pinterest) (Dimitrova, 2015). Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump both had social media presence on all major SNSs: Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The candidates also utilized SNSs that were not prevalent in 2012, such as the image messaging app Snapchat (Miller, 2016). The 2016 election also showed a change in how the candidates used

advertisements. Donald Trump had a digital first approach, focusing on Facebook more than television advertisements (Lapowsky, 2016). Facebook Live, a tool through Facebook that allows users to live video stream events, was a new feature in the 2016 election. Facebook Live allowed for Facebook users to watch campaign events from start to finish, giving potential voters more access than ever before. Social media has now become a staple in political campaigns.

One study found social networks and the Internet to be among of the top three sources young and middle age adults go to for political information (Haridakis, Hanson, Lin, & McCullough, 2015). Voters are on the candidate's sites for information on certain issues and about campaign events. Campaign sites were different from 2008, where Obama used Twitter to announce upcoming events and to mobilize his base (Ancu, 2011).

Twitter provides a political campaign with many tools: build relationships, track news coverage, gather data, and respond immediately to crises (Schill & Kirk, 2015). Political candidates have the ability to build relationships through providing users with insights into their public and personal life. A picture of a candidate having dinner with his/her family humanizes the candidate, providing more exposure to candidates than ever before. Through the use of the hashtag (#) function on Twitter, campaigns can also follow news stories as they are breaking. In today's news environment, reporters have Twitter accounts and will post an update to a story they have produced. Multiple reporters writing on a story allows for a campaign to look at how the candidate is being framed in the story. Political campaigns can also gather data about their publics through social media.

Facebook has now become the second most visited website in the United States. The majority of adults use Facebook for their social needs and social pressure (Painter, Fernandes, Mahone, & Al Nashmi, 2015). This means many people get their political information on Facebook through interactions. Prior to 2008, there was limited political activity on Facebook (Carlisle & Patton, 2013). Now, candidates have an extensive presence on Facebook. For example, the Trump campaign took advantage of the tool Facebook Live, which allowed for Trump to post a live feed of campaign rallies. Candidates are now able to give any person with a Facebook account and Internet the ability to follow the campaign real-time, providing more coverage than ever before.

Social media has changed the landscape of political communication in multiple ways. First, digital media has provided multiple avenues for political engagement. Previous communication in political campaigns gave candidates few options for communicating with potential voters; a politician would use an advertisement through radio or TV, but the audience had no way to engage with it. Social media is a user-generated platform that allows for political campaigns to use multiple tactics to communicate with the public. Political campaigns can create polls for users, allow for voters to comment on media produced by the campaign, and provide videos for the public to watch, read, and share (Dimitrova, 2015). Today, it is possible for likeminded individuals from across the U.S. to form groups and engage in online discussions about presidential candidates (Yun, Opheim, & Hanks, 2014). On Facebook, users have the ability to privately message users and form groups, allowing users to have interactive chats and create public interaction (Williams & Serge, 2011). Twitter provides the option

of hyperlinks, which allows users to provide a website link on his/her feed. This allows for user generated communication. People can also forward emails and engage in discussion board conversations (Williams & Maiorescu, 2015).

Second, social media has lowered the financial barrier for citizen participation (Carlisle & Patton, 2013). Access to the Internet and mobile phones is becoming increasingly cost-efficient. Minority and youth populations have been the largest groups to use SNSs (Hendricks & Schill, 2015; Towner & Dulio, 2015). Any politician can create a social media presence at little to no cost. Social media has decreased the time and effort political campaigns need to spend to reach an audience. Any politician can create a social media presence at little to no cost. Third, communication between the candidate and the public is now immediate. Candidates can now inform, involve, connect, and mobilize the public faster than ever before (Foot & Schneider, 2006). Previously, a candidate would have to organize a press conference, or issue a press release if he/she wanted to interact with the public. The campaign would have to organize time with major news networks to get the message out. Now, presidential candidates are able to get out their messages immediately, and the media has no choice but to follow the lead of presidential campaigns (Haridakis, Hanson, Lin, & McCullough, 2015). This gives the candidates unrestricted access to the public, while not being restricted by media. The Trump campaign had 28 million Twitter followers during the election cycle, 4 million more than the Clinton campaign (Keegan, 2017; Khan, 2016). Both campaigns now had more influence on what they could say, since the media still needed to respond to the messages made by the candidates on social media.

Lastly, the interaction between the candidate and the public has changed. Social media allows for politicians to build and maintain relationships with key publics (Kent & Taylor, 1998; Sverson, Kioussis, & Stromback, 2015). The Trump campaign would constantly pose polls from Trump's Twitter account asking users what they felt the most important issues were. Candidates are now able to maintain relationships by letting users into their lives; giving the user glimpses of the candidate's lives that was previously difficult to find.

Study 1: Extended Parallel Process Model

The first study explored the fear appeals that were used by both candidates on their social media posts. The guiding theory for the first study was Witte's (1992) extended parallel process model (EPPM). EPPM is a persuasion-based behavior change theory that proposes effective risk communication messages to elicit adaptive behavioral responses (Witte & Allen, 2000). The model's intent is to explain why some fear appeals work while others fail and to reincorporate the emotion fear as a central variable. The model incorporates previous fear appeal theories: fear-as-acquired drive model (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953); parallel process model (Leventhal, 1970); subjective expected utility (Sutton, 1982); and protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975). Each of the previous theories had inconsistencies and logical flaws, which EPPM was developed to overcome. EPPM has four constructs that constitute whether a message will be effective: severity, susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response efficacy.

Constructs

When a person is shown a fear appeal message; there are two appraisal stages that occur before an action is carried out: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. First, the subject during the threat appraisal phase will determine the threat of the problem to him/her. The subject will do this by looking at the perceived severity and susceptibility of the problem. Perceived severity is an individual's beliefs about the seriousness of the problem (Witte, 1992). A message needs to contain a high level of threat for a subject to take the problem seriously (Mitchell, 2001). In the health context, this entails talking about the negative consequences of an illness or the complications that occur from unhealthy behavior. In the political context, a candidate will talk about the severity when discussing the negative consequences of the opposing candidate winning. In the presidential election, Clinton would talk about the national security problems that would result from a Trump presidency. While looking at severity, the individual is determining the costs of the problem happening to him/her, and the negative consequences that are entailed.

The other component of the threat appraisal stage is perceived susceptibility. Perceived susceptibility is the subject's perceived chances of experiencing the threat. Both high threat and susceptibility are required for action. A person can believe a problem is severe, but believe he is at low risk of the problem happening to him. People need to believe they are susceptible to the problem happening to them (Mitchell, 2001). Susceptibility has been operationalized as the uncertainty associated with the loss of something, or the problem occurring (Yates & Stone, 1992). A message talking about the risk of getting cancer from smoking is an example of this. Political campaigns will use

susceptibility when talking about the closeness of a race. Candidates will often pander to their audience, speaking on the fears he/she knows their party has about the opposing candidate (Chipman, 2016). One study showed candidates will show fake leadership during election cycles, taking an issue he/she knows will not get acted on but is popular with the public (Canes-Wrone, Herron, & Shotts, 2001).

After the subject has gone through the threat appraisal stage, the subject engages in the coping appraisal. In this phase, a person will determine the viability of behavior change. The two components of the coping appraisal are response efficacy and self-efficacy. Perceived response efficacy is the extent the recommended response is effective and feasible in preventing/solving the problem (Witte & Allen, 2000). The subject determines whether the response will actually work. Perceived self-efficacy is determined by how confidence the person is in his/her ability to perform the recommendations. A person evaluates whether he/she has the skills, time, and/or ability to make the changes needed. A high degree of self-efficacy is necessary for behavior change (McMahon, Witte, & Meyer, 1998).

Outcomes

There are three possible outcomes after the threat and coping appraisals: danger control, fear control, or no response (Gray, 1987; LeDoux, 1996). If perceived severity and perceived susceptibility are low (the person does not believe the problem is serious and does not believe he is at risk) then the person will have no response to the message and will ignore the recommendation. When the person has high severity and susceptibility (serious and at risk), but has low perceived self-efficacy and perceived

response efficacy (doesn't believe he can do the recommendation and/or the recommendation won't work), then the person will engage in fear control processes. Fear control processes are maladaptive processes that temporarily seek to avoid the problem without engaging in action to address the problem. Fear control processes include counter-arguing, discounting the message, or even avoiding the message altogether (Witte, 1992). Defensive avoidance and reactance are two examples of fear control processes (Witte, 1998). Cho and Witte (2004) found fear control processes also interfere with an individual's cognitive processes.

Lastly, a person will engage in danger control management when all four factors are high (problem is serious, person is susceptible, person has ability to take action, and believes action will work). Danger control consists of taking action to remedy the problem. This entails taking corrective actions that seek to minimize the threat prescribed in the appeal. De Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Bruegelmans (2010) had a similar explanation, calling the two actions restore (danger control) and protect (fear control). When someone wants to restore their image, the individual is seeking a return to the state he/she was in before the problem, or the status quo in some instances. An individual will try to use protect processes to guard him/her from the current emotional state he/she is in. These two outcomes were not chosen, since the protect measure could be seen as similar to danger control.

Fear

Fear is an emotional appeal that is used to elicit a response in the recipient of the message (Brader, 2005, p 390; Chou & Lien, 2013). When a negative emotion such as

fear occurs, it elicits physiological responses; the body prepares for action, arousal increases, and limited cognitive capacity is reallocated to the brain (Chou & Lien, 2013; Nabi, 2002). One study showed the physiological effects of fear; it is accompanied by an increased heart rate, sweat on the hands, decreased blood flow to the extremities, narrowing of cognitive focus, and heightened attention (Dillard, Plotnick, Godbold, & Freimuth, 1996). According to Lazarus (1991), fear is “an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger (p 122). Fear is triggered when a person perceives a situation to be a serious threat, either physically or psychologically (1991). Fear is also the driving factor in causing fear control processes, such as defensive avoidance and reactance (Witte, 1998).

Previous Applications

The extended parallel process model has been applied to multiple contexts over the previous two decades. In most cases, EPPM has been applied to health settings: asthma (Goei, Boyson, Lyon-Callo, Schott, Wasilevich, & Cannarile, 2010); genital herpes (Mitchell, 2001); and skin cancer (Shi & Smith, 2016). EPPM has also be applied to public health emergency scenarios (Barnett, Thompson, Semon, Errett, Harrison, Anderson, & Ferrell, 2014). A growing number of articles have started to apply other emotions to the model (Carrera, Munoz, & Caballero, 2010). Lewis, Watson, and White (2013) included positive emotions (pride and humor) in addition to fear and annoyance/agitation. The researchers found other emotions can be adapted to increase one’s threat and coping appraisals.

Operationalizations

The following paragraphs will detail the variables used to operationalize the four constructs. See Study 1 Textual Codebook in Appendix A for the codebook used by the coders.

Severity is defined as the seriousness of the problem (Witte & Allen, 1992). Messages that speak to the severity, seriousness, and extremeness of the problem are examples that coders would look for in the social media posts (Hong, 2011). Messages about severity could vary; a severe message could talk about the negative state of the country if Hillary Clinton won the election, or it could be a message about the current state of the government. In surveys that measured EPPM, questions will use synonymous words such as serious, extremely harmful, threat, and negative consequence. The coders were trained to identify the multiple permutations of severity to identify if a social media post included a message on severity. Susceptibility was defined as an individual's chance of experiencing the threat (Witte, 1992). Messages that speak to the likeliness, risk, or possibility of the other candidate winning are terms used in the codebook (Hong, 2011). Social media posts that show susceptibility include messages about the likelihood of the opposing candidate winning the election. One content analysis applying EPPM included synonymous terms, such as vulnerability and familiarity with the problem (Ralston, 2016). Another study adapted the rhetorical device of urgency to describe susceptibility (Gerodimo & Justinussen, 2015). Posts talking about urgency include posts talking about the timeliness of the post, showing the amount of days until the election or other deadlines (such as self-imposed funding deadlines).

Self-efficacy was defined as a person's confidence in his/her ability to perform the recommendations. Response efficacy was defined as the extent the recommended response is effective and feasible in preventing and/or solving the problem. Sverson, Kiouisis, and Stromback (2015) looked at the cultivation strategies employed by presidential candidates during the 2012 presidential election. The researchers approached the study from the field of relationship marketing and relationship management. According to these researchers, there are eight ways candidates maintain relationships: collaboration, common interest, assurances, openness, rewarding system, co-creation, feedback, and networking. Response and self-efficacy in EPPM state a person must believe the recommended action is personally doable and will work. Collaboration, assurances, and rewarding system were adapted from the study and applied to EPPM. Social media posts that provide assurances to the user or provide a reward for participation are two forms of messages that increase the efficacy of the person. Assurances are logically verbal commitments the candidate is making to try and persuade a voter, while rewards are the candidates showing the benefits of picking him/her. An example of an assurance would be Donald Trump saying he would build a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico. The assurance is meant to assuage voters that are against illegal immigration. An example of a benefit would be Hilary Clinton talking about the chance to have dinner with her or a front row seat to one of her rallies. Collaboration brings the campaign into close proximity to the publics. Examples include: donating, volunteering, share/retweet, voting, talking to friends, signing a petition and joining a call.

Gerodimos and Justinussen (2015) conducted a content analysis of president Obama's Facebook posts during the 2012 election. The authors looked at themes and rhetoric. The categories the authors used were Benoit's functional approach, Aristotelian rhetoric, rhetorical devices, call to action, policy themes, and photo content. The calls to action used in the study included: donate, buy/offer, competition, vote, support/get, involved, and find out more. All of these calls to action are responses and forms of response efficacy. Donating to the campaign is a form of helping the candidate win, which leads to their candidate preventing the problems outlined in the fear appeal. Aristotelian rhetoric, the use of pathos, egos, and logos were also adapted to this study. Gerodimos and Justinussen (2015) found Obama used emotion and credibility more often in his Facebook posts than rational arguments. Fasuer, Cauberghe, and Hudders (2015) in a study on commercial advertising operationalized slogans used in ads, and links to the product websites as examples of messages promoting self-efficacy. The findings from the above study can be easily applied to EPPM; social media posts will often include slogans that seek to motivate a voting base. The Trump campaign had this with the #MakeAmericaGreat, while the Clinton campaign had #StrongerTogether. The post of the campaign logo, or a link to the campaign website can also be seen as a post to increase the self-efficacy of the audience.

Coding for the threat and efficacy concepts were defined as the coder's perceptions of what is relevant to the target audience. This definition was borrowed from a previous EPPM content analysis study (Ralston, 2016). The goal is to make sure the coding is not based on the coder's perceptions of what is threatening to him/her, but

instead falls within the target audience. This is important for coding political social posts, since the coders could have bias towards a candidate.

EPPM and Political Campaigns

Witte (1992) defined a threat appeal as a persuasive message designed to scare people by describing terrible things that will happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends (p 329). While EPPM has mainly been applied to health contexts to date, the model has not been applied to political campaigns. Emotions are a critical component of political advertising (Kern, 1989; Perloff & Kinsey, 1992). The use of emotions (such as fear, humor, and anger) has a persuasive effect on voters; they can increase interest in voting, increase willingness to vote, and reinforce pre-existing political preferences (Brader, 2005).

In the commercial marketing context, fear appeals are categorized into physical threat appeals and social threat appeals. Physical threat appeals are physical consequences of not adopting the promoted behaviors, while social threat appeals are the social disapproval resulting from not using a product (Sternthal & Craig, 1974). In a political campaign, both forms of fear appeals can be seen on display in political advertising. A well-known example of a fear appeal in political advertising is the “Daisy” ad during the presidential election between Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater. In the ad, an adolescent girl is picking daisies in a field with the sound of a countdown. The countdown was meant to suggest a nuclear countdown. The political campaign between Johnson and Goldwater happened during the Cold War where public fear of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia was high. The ad’s intention was to associate the

idea of nuclear war with the election of Barry Goldwater, and scare the voter that Goldwater was not fit to work in high pressure situations.

The extended parallel process model is a useful framework for determining whether persuasive messages will be effective in eliciting behavior change. The model identifies tactics that are required in order for fear appeals to be effective, which works as a checklist to make a message successful. While the main focus of EPPM studies have been on fear appeals, the model also has the potential to describe the components that are required to increase attitude, intention, and behavior. EPPM provides a useful guide for determining what components are necessary to have persuasive messages when designing interventions. Previous research on intervention design with EPPM show efficacy is a crucial component to elicit behavior change (Barnett et. al., 2014).

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The goal of the first study is to explore the tactics used by Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton on their social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram). Since this study is exploratory research of EPPM to a political context, the following research questions have been posed:

RQ1: What fear appeal constructs outlined in EPPM were used in Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump's social media posts?

Negative advertising has a long history in U.S. political advertising (Geer, 2006). Kahn and Kenney (1999) term the action of using a fear appeal against another candidate as "mudslinging." The trend has continued in the 2016 presidential election. For example, television advertisements by both candidates in the month leading up to the election were

overwhelmingly negative, with less than one in ten advertisements positive (Wallace, 2016).

EPPM describes the necessary components required for a successful fear appeal. Previous research has shown high threat, self-efficacy, and susceptibility are crucial to engage people in danger control management (Mitchell, 2001; Witte & Allen, 2000).

Thus, the following hypotheses are posed:

H1: Donald Trump's social media posts will emphasize a higher level of severity than Hillary Clinton's social media posts.

H2: Donald Trump's social media posts will emphasize a higher level of susceptibility that Hillary Clinton is capable of winning the election.

H3: Donald Trump's social media posts will have a higher level of efficacy (self-efficacy and response) than Hillary Clinton's social media posts.

In study one, posited in hypotheses 1-3, there is an underlying assumption that the winning candidate used an effective fear appeal in order to win the election. These predictions were put forward in favor of Donald Trump due to his winning of the 2016 US presidential election. Results from study 1 could provide more information and an explanation for the differences in the social media campaigns of both candidates and why it ultimately benefitted Donald Trump. Since Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election, hypotheses 1-3 serve to explore whether Trump's social media campaign did include an aspect that was superior to the Clinton campaign. Parry-Giles, Hunter, Hess, and Bhat (2016) found both candidates used attacks in their television ads, with Trump using them in a higher volume.

Research has shown fear appeals in advertising has mixed results. One study found the use of fear appeals tied to legitimate attacks mobilized voters, increasing efficacy (Kahn & Kenney, 1999). While one study found there to be evidence it worked either way (Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, & Babbitt, 1999). To date, research has not been conducted on the fear appeal tactics used in social media posts of presidential candidates. Studies merely only look at the presence or absence of negative messages/ads and does not analyze it further. Research has also been conducted on what incumbent and challenger candidates do during an election campaign. Both candidates were not treated as challengers, even though they were, since Clinton was a member of the Obama administration. Dover (2006) explains a challenger candidate will more often campaign around media events, such as big events happening in the United States and around the world. Thus, the pressure was more on the Trump campaign to use the various fear appeal tactics outlined above.

Study 2: Image Repair Theory

In the second study, the goal is to explore the strategies and tactics employed by Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton when he faced controversy during the 2015-2016 presidential election cycle. The guiding theory for analyzing how the candidates responded to crises is Benoit's image repair theory. This section will outline the assumptions and components of image repair, show examples of image repair used in politics, and apply image repair to the current election cycle.

Benoit (2015) developed image repair theory to help individuals, organizations, and institutions repair their image after it had been damaged. Image repair has two

fundamental assumptions; communication is a goal driven activity and maintaining a favorable reputation is a key goal of communication. People have goals, motivations, and purposes when they engage in communication. Goals can be vague, motivations can be difficult to see, and purposes can be ill-informed, but communication is the tool used by people to accomplish these. Second, maintaining a favorable reputation is a key goal of communication. These two fundamental assumptions create the logic for why various groups want to repair their image when it is damaged. Clark and Delia (1979) outlined three objectives in communication: overt, interpersonal, and identity. Overt transactions are used to overcome specific obstacles and/or problems. These occur when communication is explicit to solve a specific goal. Next, people engage in communication for interpersonal reasons to maintain relationships they have with one another. Lastly, communication is key to one's self-image; communication is how people establish their identity.

Two requirements need to be met for someone to engage in image repair: Stakeholders must believe the act is offensive (undesirable) and the person, organization, or institution is responsible for that action. These two requirements (undesirability and responsibility) are concepts adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen's (2010) theory of reasoned action. Values, according to the theory of reasoned action, are opinions people hold on various issues. If a person believes an action to be offensive, the person is putting a negative value on the action. A belief statement occurs when the audience believes the individual, organization, or institution to be responsible for the offensive act. An undesirable action can take many forms: it can be based on deeds, failure to perform an

action, or performing an action poorly. Responsibility can also occur in multiple forms: someone can be responsible for performing the act, allowing others to perform the act, encourage others, or facilitate the act.

Strategies

Image repair theory outlines a list of strategies an individual, organization, or institution can deploy to repair its image. Under each strategy, tactics are outlined. There are five strategies under image repair: denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification. The theory has been applied to business, individual, and government contexts. The remainder of the chapter will outline the strategies/tactics and then focus on individual and political case studies applying the theory.

Denial. The first strategy under image repair theory proposes to deny the offensive act. Two tactics are available under this strategy: simple denial and shifting the blame. A political candidate can deny the undesirable action ever occurred. This can be applied when there is not definitive proof. For example, when Anita Hill accused Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas of sexual harassment when he was her boss, Justice Thomas in his Senate hearing simply denied the act ever occurred (Benoit & Nill, 1998). Simple denial is a common tactic used by politicians (Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991; Benoit & Nill, 1998; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997).

The strategy is one of the least success strategies, since in most instances the candidates have a degree of guilt (Arendt, LaFleche, & Limperopulos, 2017). A simple denial can also be combined with explanations and/or pointing out a lack of evidence to

accusation. The second tactic an individual can deploy is to shift the blame. With this tactic, the accused party provides a different target for the public to shift its attack to. Shifting the blame answers the question of “who did it?”

Evasion of responsibility. There are times when an individual is unable to deny the offensive act occurred. It is in those situations that an individual has the ability to try and evade responsibility. Tactics under this strategy include provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. Provocation is a tactic where the individual provides an alternative explanation for why the offensive act occurred. Provocation is similar to shifting the blame with a key difference; the individual explains the offensive act was performed in response to another wrongful act (Benoit, 2015). Second, the use of the defeasibility tactic where the individual explains there was a lack of information that led to the offensive act. Here the individual explains the lack of information, or there were other factors out of the individual’s control that led to the offensive act. Lack of control is not recommended for politicians, since the public looks to politicians to take care of the public in times of crises (Benoit & Henson, 2009). For example, President Bush tried to evade responsibility when FEMA efforts were seen as lacking and inadequate during Hurricane Katrina (Benoit & Henson, 2009). President Bush refused to admit any specific wrongdoing in his handling of the Hurricane Katrina Disaster. Bush was consistent in refusing to acknowledge any wrongdoing. The end result of Bush’s handling led to a drop in his public approval rating.

The third tactic under evasion of responsibility is declaring the offensive act to be an accident. The individual seeks to evade responsibility by showing he/she was unable

to foresee the offensive act occurring. A famous example of the accident tactic being used was when Vice President Dick Cheney shot one of his friends in the face on a hunting trip (Theye, 2008). The accident tactic is effective when the message is seen as sincere; "I didn't mean to shoot my friend." Lastly, the individual can use the good intentions tactic. The individual can say there were good intentions when the offensive act occurred. The individual is not denying the act occurred but is trying to change the moral situation of the act from one of ill-intent to a more acceptable logic.

Reducing offensiveness. Situations can occur where it is not possible for the individual to deny the offensive act occurred; for he/she might be responsible. In these situations, the individual needs to reduce the negative effect it will have on him/her. Tactics under reducing offensiveness include bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attacking the accuser, and compensation. Bolstering occurs when a politician mitigates the negative effect of the act by talking about his/her positive attributes. Bolstering is one of the most popular tactics used by politicians (Dewberry & Fox, 2012). Second, minimization can be used when the politician tries to make the offensive act appear not as bad as it first appears.

The third tactic is differentiation, where the individual distinguishes the offensive act performed from other similar but less desirable actions. The purpose of differentiation is to show other actions that have occurred meriting more blame than the act the individual is accused of (Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991). Differentiation is distinct from minimization, since the former seeks to show other acts to decrease offensiveness while the latter seeks to decrease the offensiveness of the act altogether. Fourth, the

individual can use transcendence to place the act in a different context to reduce its offensiveness. During the Bush administration, while allegations of there being no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq continued, President Bush used a transcendence tactic (Benoit, 2006). Bush explained during a news conference that Saddam Hussein was still a threat to the Iraqi people and the region, placing the context away from the lack of WMDs and into a morality context for the Iraqi people and the security context for the greater region.

Fifth, the individual can attack the accuser. In the political context, the accuser is typically the media or the politician's opponent (Kaylor, 2011; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). In the 2016 election, Donald Trump would attack media stations (such as CNN or MSNBC) and/or Hillary Clinton. The purpose of attacking the accuser is to decrease the credibility of the accuser. The last tactic to reduce offensiveness is to provide compensation. Here the individual either provides or promises some form of action to alleviate the negative effects of the offensive act, to make it seem less offensive. The goal is to improve the image of the individual by helping the victims of the offensive act.

Corrective action. The individual can engage in corrective action; this occurs when he/she attempts to rectify the damage caused or prevent the reoccurrence of the offensive act. Benoit (2015) recommends corrective action as a successful strategy. However, individuals, organizations, and institutions often will not do corrective action for multiple reasons. First, corrective action can make the actor appear guilty. In some circumstances, this can invite lawsuits making it extremely costly to the accused party. In the political context, this can lead to impeachment, losing elections, or in the worst case,

prison. Second, depending on the scale of the offensive act, the corrective action could be insufficient to the public, further damaging the image of the accused party. When President Bush promised corrective action in future natural disasters after Hurricane Katrina, the tactic did not help his image since the corrective actions were seen as being insufficient in the present (Benoit & Henson, 2009). The individual, organization, or institution has to believe the corrective action will actually work with stakeholders, otherwise it further damages its reputation. Arendt, LaFleche, and Limperpulos (2017) conducted a meta-analysis of journal articles dedicated to apologia, image repair, and crisis communication and found correction action to be one of the most successful strategies.

Mortification. Lastly, the individual can engage in mortification. Here the politician admits to the wrongful act and asks for forgiveness. This strategy can be effective if the public perceives the apology as being sincere. Mortification is a difficult strategy to deploy, since admission of the offensive act can often lead to a further loss of reputation. The negative consequences are similar to corrective actions. For a politician, these can mean a loss of campaign funds and/or support from the political party.

Political Examples

One of the early applications of the image repair model to a political crisis was President Ronald Reagan during the Iran-contra affair. Benoit and researchers looked at the messages from Reagan during the Iran-contra affair and found four tactics were used: denial, differentiation, mortification, and corrective action. There was a sequential order

for these tactics, with Reagan at first denying the U.S. traded arms for hostages and also denying the money was being diverted to Nicaragua.

The image repair model has been applied to many Republican candidates: Reagan during the Iran-contra affair (Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991); New Gingrich while he was Speaker of the House accepting a large book deal connected to Rupert Murdoch (Kennedy & Benoit, 1997); Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas during allegations of sexual harassment while going through confirmation hearings to become a Supreme Court justice (Benoit & Nill, 1998); President Bush during FEMA's ineffective responses after Hurricane Katrina (Benoit & Henson, 2009).

Research Questions and Hypotheses

During a political campaign, candidates are constantly facing threats to their image, face, and reputation. During the 2015-2016 presidential campaign, both candidates faced many accusations of offensive acts. Based on empirical research of image repair theory, the following research question and hypothesis are proposed:

RQ1: What image repair strategies did Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton use when responding to negative public relations incidents that occurred during the 2016 presidential election campaign?

H1: Donald Trump will use the tactic denial on his social media posts when confronted with an offensive act.

H2: Hillary Clinton will use the tactic denial on her social media posts when confronted with an offensive act.

Research on the effectiveness of denial is mixed; with some studies finding it to be an effective strategy (Benoit & Nill, 1998; Johnson, 2015), while others deem it less effective (Arendt, LaFleche, & Limperopulos, 2017). The above authors conducted a meta-analysis of every study that has used the image repair theory and was on political scandals. The authors found simple denial to be the most common strategy deployed.

H3: Donald Trump will use the tactic bolstering on his social media posts when confronted with an offensive act.

H4: Hillary Clinton will use the tactic bolstering on her social media posts when confronted with an offensive act.

Empirical evidence shows that bolstering is one of the most common tactics used by politicians, which is why it was concluded both candidates would use it as one of their strategies (Dewberry & Fox, 2012). Politicians historically prefer to talk about themselves in a positive light, which bolstering allows for (Benoit, 2007). One example of this can be seen in presidential debates, where candidates will overwhelmingly enjoy talking about themselves rather than attacking their opponents or defending themselves (Benoit, 2007).

H5: Donald Trump will use the tactic attacking the accuser on his social media posts when confronted with an offensive act.

Attacking the accuser is a strategy that has been seen in multiple case studies on image repair (Benoit, 2015; Benoit & Nill, 1997; Kennedy & Benoit, 1997). The tactic has also been used in liberal campaigns (Kaylor, 2011). Since Trump built a large portion of his campaign around attacking the media establishment, it is logical to surmise

attacking the accuser would be a tactic Trump would use to respond to an offensive act. Empirical research on image repair shows corrective action is an effective strategy to repair one's image (Benoit, Gullifor, & Panici, 1991; Johnson, 2015). However, a cursory look at the election campaign by Donald Trump shows that Trump rarely, if ever, apologizes or promises to fix a mistake. This runs contrary to what previous research on political scandals shows, but is a logical conclusion of how the Trump campaign handles scandals.

Entertainment-Education Communication

The guiding theory for both studies is the entertainment-education communication theory. Entertainment education is defined as “the process of designing and implementing entertainment messages that seek to increase audience knowledge about an educational issue, create favorable attitudes, change social norms, and/or change overt behavior” (Singhal & Rogers, 2004, p. 5). Entertainment-education (E-E) is a behavior-change theory that seeks to stimulate pro-social behavior changes. After the message has been shown, the messenger invites the audience to act through secondary texts: examples include press interviews, behind the work, social networks, posters, and Internet forums (Gesser-Edelsburg & Singhal, 2013). Entertainment-education has been shown to be effective by making the message appear less obvious, decreasing the chance of reactance (Murphy, Frank, Moran, & Patroe-Woodley, 2011). The goal of the entertainment-education is to decrease counter-arguing from messages.

Entertainment-education communication draws from multiple communication theories: social cognitive theory, elaboration likelihood model, dramatic theories, social

constructivism, agenda setting, audience involvement, and cultivation analysis.

Entertainment-education communication has been used in a variety of health contexts: coping with loss (Campo Desens & Hughes, 2013); HIV/AIDS (Kennedy, O'Leary, Beck, Pollard, & Simpson, 2004); cancer (Murphy, Frank, Moran, & Patroe-Woodley, 2011; Sharif & Friemuth, 1993); and family planning (Collins, Elliott, Berry, Kanouse, & Hunter, 2003). In entertainment-education communication, there are three constructs that can lead to behavior change: involvement with a specific character, involvement with the narrative (transportation), viewers' emotional reaction to the narrative.

Constructs

When an audience member is involved with the character, they are vicariously learning the selected behavior that the character is enacting. This vicarious learning was taken directly from Bandura's social cognitive theory (1977). During the program, the response efficacy and self-efficacy of the audience increases. The person watching the program thinks he can emulate some of the pro-social behaviors he is watching. People will relate more to characters that are like them (Sharif & Friemuth, 1993; Singhal & Rogers, 1999). Polling data can be one way to look at whether a person likes one candidate over another. On social media, the use of the like, love, or share functions on an individual post is another way to see if a person relates and/or likes the candidate.

There are four variables that are under involvement with a character: perceive similarity, liking, wishful identification, parasocial interaction (PSI). Perceived similarity refers to the degree to which an individual perceives he/she is similar to the character. (Moyer-Guse, 2008). Ways a person can relate to include but are not limited to: physical

attributes, demographics variables, beliefs, personalities, or values. When a person votes for a presidential candidate, often the person will have a variety of similar attributes with the person he/she is voting for. On social media, a person that shares a candidate's post will often be sharing a value of the candidate that he/she relates too. Liking is the positive evaluations of the character (Cohen, 2001). Liking can be measured easily on social media through liking a candidate's social media post.

Parasocial interaction (also called PSI) is the seeming face-to-face relationship between the spectator and the performer (Horton & Wohl, 1956, p. 215). Research has been shown people develop these relationships with newscasters, television hosts, and fictional TV characters (Hoffner, 1996). When the PSI is high, the person will believe the message of the sender is credible. In a political campaign, this would lead to the person voting for a candidate. The media exposure of candidates can also lead to an increase in PSI (Brown & Fraser, 2004). Lastly, wishful identification occurs when the viewer wants to be like the character and has an active desire to emulate the character (Moyer-Guse, 2008).

Involvement with the narrative is another construct, where the audience is transported and he/she becomes part of the narrative that he/she is viewing, hearing, or reading (Green & Brock, 2000). A few processes occur during involvement with the narrative; the viewer loses awareness of his surroundings, there are heightened emotions/motivations, and after the viewers emerge from the transported state they are deeply engrossed in the narrative. Involvement with the narrative has been found to be a

predictive indicator of increasing knowledge (Murphy, Frank, Moran, & Patroe-Woodley, 2011).

The last construct is emotional reaction to the narrative. Narratives that are filled with emotions have been shown to be gripping and persuasive (Dillard & Peck, 2000). There are many opportunities for the viewer to have an emotional investment with the fictional character in entertainment-education. The type of emotion can lead to different outcomes. For example, negative emotions such as anger can lead to an increase in information processing (Nabi, 2002).

Application

Entertainment-education communication is a behavior change theory designed to educate and entertain people on important health and social issues. Entertainment-education is the guiding theory for both studies and applies in this unique political climate. Entertainment-education communication is a useful theory to apply to the 2016 presidential campaign, since both candidates could also be seen as characters trying to promote voters to a specific behavior (vote for Trump or Clinton). Celebrities have been shown to have the ability to change values, beliefs, and attitudes of the public (Brown & Fraser, 2004). For example, when Henry Winkler's character Fonzie from the TV show *Happy Days* went to the library in an episode, there was a substantial uptick in library card subscriptions (Brown, 1992). Celebrities have been known to be champions of prosocial behaviors and has happened often when it comes to changing purchasing behavior (Erdogan, Baker, & Tagg, 2001). It would be easy to argue that both presidential candidates in the 2016 are celebrities. Both were celebrities before the

election began; Clinton was known as a First Lady and Secretary of State, while Trump was well known for his TV show the Apprentice.

Entertainment-education is also applicable to the extended parallel process model (EPPM), since a variety of components in EPPM are also used in the entertainment-education model. Response efficacy and self-efficacy are two major components in whether involvement with a character is successful and also determines the outcome a person will take in EPPM. The use of emotion is also a large component in both the E-E model as well as EPPM. The E-E model can also be applied to image repair theory, since the use of narrative is a strong part of image repair theory. When a scandal arises, the candidate has to respond using a variety of tactics. Since candidates can also be seen as characters, a particular scandal can also be viewed as an episode during the election cycle. The entertainment-education model can help explain the viability of both theories during the 2016 presidential election.

Visual Communication in Political Campaigns

A political campaign will use multiple tools in order to persuade. These could include holding a rally, call banks, door-to-door canvassing, and most notably advertising. Visual communication has and will continue to play a role in political campaigns. Photos on the candidates' social media accounts engage and inform a non-specialized readership (Finn, 2012). A person will often see a picture from Facebook or Instagram before reading the caption that is accompanied with it.

The use of visuals in political campaigns has a long history dating back to the rise of political advertising. Grabe and Bucy (2009) conducted a content analysis of images

used in presidential campaigns going back decades. The authors found there were three types of candidates shown: populist, ideal, and sure loser. Each candidate would have a specific set of characteristics. For example, the ideal candidate would have a physical appeal and show statesmanship. Statesmanship included the candidate next to areas that connected the candidate with a positive ideal, such as President Bush next to Mt. Rushmore. Populist images would be used in opposition to aristocratic and self-serving elites. Examples of images using populist imagery would include images with celebrities or linkages to large and approving crowds. The sure loser candidate would have images that would show missteps, sudden changes in fortune, or poor judgment. Images showing sparse attendance of a rally or the inattentiveness of the candidate are examples of this sure loser imagery.

Previous studies have looked at the tone of the candidate (negative, neutral, positive), the presence or absence of the candidate, or the actions of the candidate (Conners, 2016). Actions could include meeting with people, smiling in front of a crowd, or speaking at an event. For tone, the picture of the candidates on their platforms would be either positive or neutral, while the picture of the opposing candidate on their platform would be negative. For example, images of Donald Trump on Hillary Clinton's social media platforms would show negative tones of Trump.

However, little research has been conducted on visual communication in political campaigns and its application to behavior change. Gerodmis and Justinussen (2015) conducted a content analysis of images used in President Obama's Facebook posts. The information was descriptive, providing information on who was in the photo and what

their action was without attaching this to behavior change theory. Lavoie and Quick (2013) did examine self-efficacy by looking at images reinforcing how to perform the advocated behavior.

Visual communication plays a role in both study 1 and study 2. In study 1, the use of images can be used as a tactic to deploy one of the constructs outlined in EPPM. Previous studies have applied Bandura's social modeling theory to images where publics through observing images learn which behaviors are (in)appropriate (Kenney, 2009). In the political context politicians can use images to deploy any EPPM tactic. An image can show the severity of an issue, post an image of a poll to emphasize the susceptibility messaging, or show the candidates' plans on an issue as a form of efficacy messaging. Images are crucial to EPPM; the content analysis of EPPM material has been used to show a person performing the recommended action (Basil, Basil, Deshpande, & Larack, 2013). In regard to study 2, images can be used in conjunction with strategies and tactics outlined under image repair theory. For example, a candidate may use imagery to use a bolstering tactic where he highlights the positive aspects of himself on a particular issue. Findings from studies 1 and 2 may contribute to a better understanding of the use of imagery in both EPPM and image repair theory while also showing the uses of imagery in social media campaigns.

Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation is to explore the different tactics and strategies used during the 2016 US presidential campaign on social media. The two studies conducted look at the candidates' tactics from different angles. In study 1, the goal of the study is to

explore whether the candidates used different components of fear appeal messaging that the EPPM model describes as necessary to have an effective fear appeal. Negative campaigning is certainly not new to political campaigns, but the immediacy of social media posts coupled with the lack of traditional media checks both warrant the need for further analysis. In study 2, the goal of the study is to identify how Trump and Clinton acted on social media during a crisis. The image repair theory has rich empirical history on the costs and benefits of each tactic, as well as predicts what tactics candidates will use most of the time. Study 2 also provides a deeper glimpse into the specific tactics used, focusing on a sharper and intentional timeline than study 1. Study 2 seeks to bring this into the age of social media and determine if it aligns with previous research.

Entertainment-education theory is the guiding theory that aligns both study 1 and study 2 together. The entertain-education communication theory is a behavior change theory designed to education and entertain people on important health and social issues. This dissertation expands issues to the political realm. The entertainment-education theory shares similar tactics with the extended parallel process model in terms of providing efficacy. Entertainment-education also helps provide a clearer image on image repair theory. The literature review on entertainment-education showed publics can be persuaded by celebrities. Image repair theory has been applied to many individuals and corporations, from movie celebrities to politicians.

.

METHODOLOGY

This study will be a multi-phase content analytic examination of the social media posts used by Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during the 2016 presidential election campaign. The first study looked at the textual and visual images from Donald Trump's and Hillary Clinton's social media posts, while the second study looked at Donald Trump's and Hillary Clinton's posts in the days following political scandals. The quantitative content analysis method was chosen to examine the frequency in which certain tactics were used by the two campaigns, with EPPM and image repair theory as the guiding frameworks.

Study 1: EPPM

Sample

The social media posts of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton were taken directly from their social media platforms. The social media posts were publicly available. However, the sample posts were taken months after the election, which meant that some of the hyperlinks provided in the post were dead. Specifically, the social media platforms included Facebook (@DonaldTrump, @HillaryClinton), Instagram (@realDonaldTrump, @hillaryclinton), and Twitter (@realDonaldTrump, @HillaryClinton). The timeline for the sample was over three months (July 18th, 2016 to October 18th, 2016). Previous studies have used convenience samples when looking at presidential campaigns (Adams

& McCorkindale, 2013). The start date of the timeline was the beginning of the Republican National Convention. This date marked the official recognition of Donald Trump as the Republican candidate for president. Previously, Trump had to divide his attention between Hillary Clinton and the Republican primary opponents. The start date was chosen, since it marked the beginning of Trump's sole focus on the Democratic nominee. The three-month timeline was chosen to gather a large sample size, and spanned multiple campaign events, controversies, and debates. The number of posts in the sample for Donald Trump were: Instagram (n=285), Facebook (n=972), and Twitter (n=483). The number of posts in the sample for Hillary Clinton were: Instagram (n=340), Facebook (n=1,000), and Twitter (n=946).

In the three platforms, the social media posts also contained images with textual posts. Thus, two separate content analyses were conducted: textual and visual. The above mentioned sample was for the textual content analysis. In the instances the coder saw a post that contained both text and a visual image, the coder was instructed to view the text in the visual image as an extension of the textual message. For example, one Trump post tweet contained the following text "Today is the day! Knock on doors and make calls with us on National Day of Action! TrumpTrain #MAGA #gop.cm/nv5vmm." The tweet included an image of Trump with a quote, "It used to be cars were made in Flint, and you couldn't drink the water in Mexico. Now, the cars are made in Mexico and you can't drink the water in Flint – Donald J. Trump." A second content analysis was conducted of the visual images used by the campaigns. The number of Trump posts with images were the following: Instagram (n=285), Facebook (n=500), and Twitter (n=123). The number

of Clinton posts with images were the following: Instagram (n=300), Facebook (n=485), and Twitter (n=111). The following sections will detail the two content analyses.

Coding Training

Three coders were involved in analyzing the social media posts. The unit of analysis for the study was the individual post. The coders were trained in four steps. The posts were unitized into themes in the social media post. Since most of the posts were small, the themes were easier to gather. Second, the coders read research on the extended parallel process model, specifically articles that conducted content analyses. Third, the coders studied the codebook developed for the study and provided feedback. Feedback led to alterations, such as combination of variables or the inclusion of a better example for a variable. Lastly, the coders practiced coding social media posts and the decisions made were discussed. Intercoder reliability tests were conducted after each coding session. For each section of the study, the coders were provided source material on the theory, and given examples of posts they could see. The coders then had a discussion over agreement on the measures. Coders were given one week to look over the material and conduct a preliminary test before meeting again to discuss the results.

An intercoder reliability test was used to determine if the coders reached the same conclusion. ReCal was used to conduct the intercoder reliability test. Reliability was calculated on 10% of the sample. Krippendorff's Alpha was chosen as the reliability test, and all items need to be within acceptable ranges ($>.70$) in order to be considered.

Textual Content Analysis

The themes were classified under the following categories: susceptibility, severity, self-efficacy, and response efficacy. These four categories are the required constructs for a fear appeal to be effective. Since the platform of social media is short messages, one construct will typically only be shown in each post. A social media post with severity referred to the costs associated with voting for the opposing candidate. Previous research on EPPM has focused primarily on the health costs (Witte, 1992). Study 1 expanded severity to include costs past health (social, financial, etc.). Susceptibility in social media posts was the likelihood of the opposing candidate winning the election and then bringing the negative costs of the opposing candidate winning. Severity and susceptibility did not necessarily need to be in the same social media post. One example Donald Trump tweet shows an example of severity “Ted Cruz talks about the Constitution but doesn't say that if the Dems win the Presidency, the new JUSTICES appointed will destroy us all!” In the post above the Trump campaign wants the public to believe Hillary Clinton will destroy the United States via her hypothetical Supreme Court Justices. A susceptibility social media post to pair the above post would include Donald Trump showing how Hillary Clinton was winning the election or had a chance of winning the election. Susceptibility posts speak to the likelihood of the negative action happening. Efficacy was shown through texts and images to reinforce how the public could perform the advocated behavior by the candidate in hopes of increasing confidence of the public to follow through and perform the recommended action (Witte, 1992). Messages that contained efficacy would either speak the character and experience of the candidate or provide information on how the public could get involved. Posts that contained efficacy

messages would show links to the candidates' websites where the public could donate, volunteer, and get information on where to vote.

Experiments have been the primary research method used in EPPM articles (Witte & Allen, 2000). The codebook for this study was adapted from previous experiments using EPPM. Typical studies using the model will specify an adverse health condition, suggestion one or more actions to prevent the condition, show visual/narratives, and be shown in a relatively short time-period (Carrera, Munoz, & Caballero, 2010; Hong, 2011). Previous studies have conducted content analyses of EPPM components in messages (Basil, Basil, Deshpande, & Larack, 2013). One study looked at the use of EPPM factors in workplace safety messages (Basil, Basil, Deshpande, & Larack, 2013).

Visual Content Analysis

The images provided by the campaign contained a level of persuasive intent. Visual communication helps the social process through which messages are exchanged (Kenney, 2009). Visual communication was analyzed in both study 1 and study 2. The work of Grabe and Bucy (2009) was adapted to examine the efficacy messaging used by the candidates. For example, a favorable background, such as the candidate surrounded by a crowd of people has the intent of indicating a particular candidate has high popularity and is capable of accomplishing change. Images were adapted to make the candidate look strong and their opposing candidate look weak.

Study 1 examined the images used on the social media platforms of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. In study 1 the text of images were analyzed in combination with the textual content analysis that was performed. For example, a visual image in a

campaign could provide a link or show people that were being active on the campaign. The goal of the image could be to provide an image for the voter where he/she could donate or volunteer. Images play an important role to messages about efficacy. Visual communication was included in the coding process when looking at social media posts that contained images. Lastly, the codebook also looked at the inclusion of campaign hashtags, the campaign slogan, and links to the campaign website. These were all examples of ways potential voters could get involved, highlighting response efficacy messaging (Towner, 2016).

Study 2: Image Repair

Sample

The social media posts of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton were taken directly from the social media platforms of the Trump and Clinton campaigns. Specifically, the social media posts include Facebook (@DonaldTrump), Instagram (@realDonaldTrump), and Twitter (@realDonaldTrump). The social media posts were publicly available. For Trump, the timeline of the posts was from October 7th, 2016 to October 17th, 2016. The start of the posts came after the Washington Post released its article detailing the Trump sexual harassment video after an “Access Hollywood” interview in 2005. The 10-day timeline was chosen to ensure the researchers obtained each post from Trump’s social media platforms in response to the leaked video. The population for the social media posts during this timeline are the following: Instagram (n=40), Facebook (n=81), and Twitter (n=72). The posts for the content analysis were mainly textual. Donald Trump had a 90-second video response posted to his Twitter account after the story was leaked.

Short videos were transcribed and included into the larger population. Images with text were considered an extension of the text and included in the content analysis. Long form videos, such as Facebook Live, that were posted during this timeline were not included.

For Hillary Clinton, social media posts included Facebook (@HillaryClinton), Instagram (@hillaryclinton), and Twitter (@HillaryClinton). For Clinton, the timeline of the posts was from September 2nd, 2016 to September 9th, 2016. The start of the posts came the day the FBI released its report on the Clinton email investigation (Wallace, 2016). The 10-day timeline was chosen for the same reason as the above Trump scandal. The population for the social media posts during this timeline are the following: Instagram (n=32), Facebook (n=62), and Twitter (n=56). Images with text were considered an extension of the text and included in the content analysis. Long form videos, such as Facebook Live, that were posted during this timeline were not included.

Coding Procedure

Three coders were involved in analyzing the social media posts. The unit of analysis for the study was the individual post. The coders were trained in four steps: The posts were unitized into themes by the researcher. Since the social media platforms tend to have less than 140 characters, the posts were already unitized into themes. Second, the coders read research on image repair theory and political scandals. Third, the coders studied the codebook developed for the study and provided feedback. Feedback led to alterations, such as the combination of variables or the inclusion of a better example for a variable. Lastly, the coders practiced coding social media posts and the decisions made were discussed.

An intercoder reliability test was used to determine if the coders reached the same conclusion. ReCal was used to conduct the intercoder reliability test. Reliability was calculated on 10% of the sample. Krippendorff's Alpha was chosen for the reliability test, and all items need to be within acceptable ranges ($>.70$) in order to be considered.

Categories

The themes were classified under the following categories: denial, evading responsibility, reduce offensiveness, mortification, and corrective action. The five categories are the strategies proposed by Benoit's image repair theory. See Study 2 Image Repair Codebook in Appendix C for more details. For some categories, multiple tactics that were included. Under denial, the two tactics proposed are simple denial and shifting the blame. Denial was defined as a candidate denying the event ever occurred. Second, shifting the blame is defined as the candidate moving the blame from himself to a different target. Trump would use simple denial by denying the harassment ever occurred and would use shifting blame by providing a different target for the harassment allegation.

Evasion of responsibility included: provocation, defeasibility, accident, and good intentions. Provocation was defined as telling the audience the offensive act was done in response to a different act, with better intentions. Defeasibility was defined as the candidate explaining a lack of information or control over the situation. Accident was defined as the candidate explaining the offensive act was unintentional or a mistake. In political scandal, a politician might suggest it was accident that it was recorded, and he would not conduct himself like that in a public setting. Good intentions were defined as

the candidate explaining the positive logic that went into the offensive act. Most tactics would logically not be shown in the political scandal context, specifically sexual harassment. A candidate that explained he engaged in sexual harassment because of a lack of information would lose quickly.

Reducing offensiveness included: bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attacking the accuser, and compensation. Bolstering was defined as the candidate talking about his other positive attributes. An example of this would be Trump discussing his positive relationship with women, or positive aspects of his business career. Minimization was defined as the candidate try to decrease the impact of the offensive act, making it appear not as bad as it appears. Minimization in the election cycle would include talking about Trump not acting on the harassment, or never being found guilty of harassment. Differentiation was defined as the candidate distinguishing the act from other less desirable actions. In differentiation, the candidate is try to draw parallels to other situations. Differentiation would occur when Trump would bring up the sexual harassment charges that occurred with President Clinton in the 1990s.

Transcendence was defined as the candidate placing the offensive act in a different context. Attacking the accuser was defined as the candidate attacking the sender of the message, or a third party that is also talking about the message. In a political context, Trump would attack the *Washington Post*, who wrote the initial article. Trump could also attack the Democratic party, specifically Hillary Clinton, that used the video to their benefit. Compensation was defined as providing some form of relief to the victims of the offensive act. Compensation would include funds to the victims. Corrective action was

defined as candidate rectifying the damage caused or making a commitment to prevent reoccurrence. For Trump, this could include making promises to engage in acceptable behavior, commit resources to stop sexual harassment, and promise for the event not to occur. Mortification was defined as the candidate admitting the wrongful act and asking for forgiveness.

RESULTS

Study 1

In study one, the data were first analyzed by first examining the presence or absence of the tactics described for an effective fear appeal by the extended parallel process model (EPPM). The presence of tactics in the social media posts were framed as either present or absent. Results were logged by looking at social media posts individually and were then grouped as either posts from the social media accounts of Hillary Clinton or from the accounts of Donald Trump. The number of social media posts present in all of the social media platforms sampled from Donald Trump was 516. The number of social media posts present from each of the three social media platforms sampled from Donald Trump was: Facebook n=171, Instagram n=120, and Twitter n=225. The number of social media posts present in all of the social media platforms sampled from Hillary Clinton was 434. The number of social media posts present from each of the social media platforms sampled from Hillary Clinton was: Facebook n=132, Instagram n=74, and Twitter n=225.

Research question one in this study posed the question: What fear appeal constructs outlined in EPPM were used in Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump's social media posts? Three hypotheses were then proposed that explored predictions about the

different tactics used to present an effective fear appeal message, according to the model.

Below are the results related to each hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1.

The first hypothesis stated Donald Trump’s social media posts will emphasize a higher level of severity than Hillary Clinton’s social media posts. The results did not support this hypothesis. The tactic severity was present in 39.1% (n=227) of social media posts by Donald Trump and in 38.3% (n=192) of social media posts from Hillary Clinton. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the frequency of the severity tactic in the social media posts of the candidates. No significant association was found ($X^2 (2) = 1.212, p = .546$). The results of the Chi-square tests conducted are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Severity Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Clinton / Trump	1.212	2	.546
Facebook	.404	1	.525
Instagram	1.122	1	.289
Twitter	4.993	1	.025
Platform	48.679	1	.000

A Chi-square statistic was also calculated comparing the frequency of severity tactics used across the various social platforms. No significant association was found between Facebook ($X^2 (1) = .404, p = .525$) and Instagram ($X^2 (1) = 1.122, p = .289$), A significant association was found between severity and Twitter ($X^2 (1) = 4.993, p = .025$). The severity tactic was present in 48% (n = 108) of Donald Trump’s tweets more than

Clinton’s 37.8% (n = 93). However, all of the associations with severity and individual platforms was not found to be significant. When the three platforms were combined, a significant interaction was found between tactic severity and social media platforms ($X^2(1) = 48.679, p = .000$). Severity was found to be in 46% (n=172) of Facebook posts, 19% (n=46) of Instagram posts, and 42% (n=172) of Twitter posts.

Hypothesis 2.

The second hypothesis stated Donald Trump’s social media posts will emphasize a higher level of susceptibility that Hillary Clinton is capable of winning the election. The results did support this hypothesis. The Chi-square test comparing the frequency of the susceptibility tactic in the social media posts of Trump and Clinton found a significant association ($X^2(1) = 22.416, p = .000$). The tactic susceptibility was present in 17.2% (n = 100) of social media posts by Donald Trump and in 7.6% (n = 38) of social media posts from Hillary Clinton. More posts from Donald Trump 17.2% (n = 100) contained the susceptibility tactic than in Hillary Clinton’s 7.6% (n = 38). Results of the Chi-square tests conducted are show in Table 2.

Table 2. Susceptibility Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Clinton / Trump	22.416	1	.000
Facebook	9.147	1	.002
Instagram	6.916	1	.009
Twitter	10.133	1	.001
Platform	22.263	2	.000

A Chi-square statistic was also calculated comparing the frequency of susceptibility and the various social media platforms. A significant association was found between Facebook ($X^2 (1) = 9.147, p = .002$), Instagram ($X^2 (1) = 6.916, p = .009$), and Twitter ($X^2 (1) = 10.133, p = .001$). On Facebook, Trump had a greater frequency of using susceptibility 9.4% ($n = 20$) than Clinton 1.9% ($n = 3$). This was also true on Instagram, where Trump was two times more likely to have susceptibility posts 21.4% ($n = 31$) than Clinton 8.5% ($n = 8$). The same results were shown on Twitter, Trump used the susceptibility tactic more often 21.8% ($n = 49$) than Clinton 11% ($n = 27$). A Chi-square test was also conducted on the frequency of the susceptibility tactic with all platforms combined, this test yield similar significant results to the individual Chi-square tests performed ($X^2 (2) = 22.263, p = .000$).

Hypothesis 3.

The last hypothesis stated Donald Trump's social media posts will have a higher level of efficacy (self-efficacy and response) than Hillary Clinton's social media posts. The results supported this hypothesis. The Chi-square test comparing the frequency of the efficacy tactic in the social media posts of Trump and Clinton found a significant association ($X^2 (3) = 19.058, p = .000$). The tactic efficacy was present in 31.4% ($n=182$) of social media posts by Donald Trump and in 37.2% ($n=187$) of social media posts from Hillary Clinton. The efficacy tactic was divided into four categories: none present, low level, moderate level, and high level of efficacy. In social media posts by Trump: 26.3% ($n = 152$) had a low level of efficacy, 2.2% ($n = 13$) had a moderate level of efficacy, and 2.9% ($n = 17$) had a high level of efficacy. In social media posts by Clinton: 28.2% ($n =$

142) had a low level of efficacy, 7.4% (n = 37) had a moderate level of efficacy, and 1.6% (n = 8) had a high level of efficacy. The results of the Chi-square tests conducted are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Efficacy Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Clinton / Trump	19.058	3	.000
Facebook	4.072	3	.254
Instagram	8.873	2	.012
Twitter	18.194	3	.000
Platform	42.454	6	.000

A Chi-square statistic was also calculated comparing the frequency of efficacy and the various social media platforms. A significant association was found on Instagram ($X^2(1) = 8.873, p = .012$), and on Twitter ($X^2(1) = 18.194, p = .000$). Interestingly, Clinton social media posts on both Instagram and Twitter were more likely to have efficacy posts than Trump social media posts. On Instagram, Hillary efficacy posts (44.7%) were found more frequently than Donald efficacy posts (29.6%). However, on Twitter the difference between Clinton efficacy posts (34.5%) and Trump efficacy posts were negligible (32.4%). There was no statistically significant difference found between Facebook and efficacy ($X^2(3) = 4.072, p = .254$). Clinton was found to have more efficacy posts on her Facebook, but no significant association was found. The degrees of freedom in Table 3 varied wildly. The efficacy variable contained three categorical variables (high, medium, and low) for efficacy. The degrees of freedom for Instagram was 2 due to the absence of one category, while the platform category included 6 in error.

Study 2

In study two, the data were first analyzed by examining the presence or absence of tactics outlined in the image repair theory. The presence of social media posts was framed as either present or absent. Results were logged by looking at the social media posts individually for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The content analysis conducted for each candidate was situational. The content analysis for Hillary Clinton was on her reaction to the FBI leaks, while the content analysis for Donald Trump was about reactions to the leaked “Access Hollywood” tape. The content analysis for each candidate provides a case study for how the individual candidate responded to a crisis concerning personal reputation. In study two, the data were first analyzed by looking at the presence and absence of tactics described as effective in the image repair theory. Results were logged by examining the social media posts individually.

In study two, the research question posed the following query: what image repair strategies did Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton use when responding to negative public relations incidents that occurred during the 2016 presidential election campaign? Five hypotheses were proposed based on knowledge of previous political campaigns and image repair theory. The content analysis of Hillary Clinton social media messaging in study two examined 120 social media posts across Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The content analysis did not show the presence of any of the following tactics: compensation, corrective action, mortification, accident, simple denial, shifting of blame, nor provocation. A Chi-square test was conducted on the remaining tactics. The results of the Chi-square tests conducted are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Clinton Image Repair Tactics Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Defeasibility	.367	2	.832
Good Intentions	1.505	2	.471
Bolstering	4.459	2	.108
Minimization	.277	2	.870
Differentiation	1.141	2	.565
Transcendence	.367	2	.852
Attack Accuser	.585	2	.746

The content analysis of Donald Trump in study two looked at 110 social media posts across Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The content analysis did not show the presence of the following tactics: shift blame, accident, good intentions, provocation, compensation, nor mortification. A Chi-square test was conducted on the remaining tactics. The results of the Chi-square tests conducted are shown in Table 5. Table 5 also includes the variable corrective action, which was present but not predicted from the literature review.

Table 5. Trump Image Repair Tactics Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Simple Denial	2.217	2	.330
Defeasibility	.668	2	.716
Bolstering	6.404	2	.041
Minimization	.668	2	.716
Differentiation	.913	2	.633
Transcendence	2.217	2	.330
Attack Accuser	5.497	2	.064
Corrective Action	6.262	2	.044

Hypothesis 1.

The first hypothesis stated that Donald Trump will use the tactic denial on his social media posts when confronted with an offensive act. The results did not support this hypothesis. The tactic simple denial was present in three posts but was not found to be significant ($X^2 (2) = 2.217, p = .330$).

Hypothesis 2.

The second hypothesis stated Hillary Clinton will use the tactic denial on her social media posts when confronted with an offensive act. The results did not support this hypothesis. There was not a single time Clinton use the simple denial tactic in her social media posts.

Hypothesis 3.

The third hypothesis stated Donald Trump will use the tactic bolstering on his social media posts when confronted with an offensive act. The results did support this hypothesis. Bolstering was present in 23% ($n = 26$) of Trump posts. There was a significant association was found on bolstering ($X^2 (2) = 6.404, p = .041$).

Hypothesis 4.

The fourth hypothesis stated Hillary Clinton will use the tactic bolstering on her social media posts when confronted with an offensive act. The results did not support this hypothesis. No significant association was found on bolstering ($X^2 (2) = 4.459, p = .108$). The tactic bolstering, where the candidate talks about her positive attributes, was shown in almost half of her social media posts ($n = 57$).

Hypothesis 5.

The last hypothesis stated Donald Trump will use the tactic attacking the accuser on his social media posts when confronted with an offensive act. The results did not support this hypothesis. No significant association was found between Trump social media posts and the attack the accuser tactic ($X^2 (2) = 5.497, p = .064$). Similar to the bolstering tactic with Clinton, the tactic of attacking the accuser was found in 40% (n=45) of Trump social media posts.

DISCUSSION

Social media has changed the landscape of political communication. The 2016 presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump marked a significant change on social media's relationship to presidential campaigns. Politicians in the age of social media have next to unfettered access to millions of potential voters without some of the historical checks of traditional media. Previous presidential candidates would have to schedule events or use the bully pulpit in order to get their message out. The immediacy of a tweet or Instagram post gives politicians the ability to quickly communicate and persuade voters.

In a political campaign the main goal is to persuade voters that one candidate is preferable over the other. The goal of this research was to examine and contextualize the different strategies and tactics used by the 2016 US presidential candidates on their social media posts. Study 1 applied Witte's persuasion-based behavior change model, the extended parallel process model, to examine whether the social media posts made by Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton during the 2016 US presidential campaign had components that could be used to have an effective fear appeal. While the use of a fear appeal, or negative advertising, is not a novel tactic social media provides a new context in the political arena. The discussion for study 1 will outline the findings of the content

analysis performed, what these results mean for political communication and future campaigns, as well as the relevance of EPPM's application to a political context.

Study 2 in this dissertation sought to provide more context on what tactics Clinton and Trump used during the campaign. While the application of the EPPM to a political campaign is new ground, image repair theory has been applied to numerous political campaigns over the decades. From the Justice Clarence Thomas responses after the Anita Hill hearings to President Obama's responses after the early headaches in the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, empirical research backs many of the tactics outlined under image repair theory. However, study 2 provides context on whether the same findings of image repair theory can be applied to politicians in the age of social media. The discussion for study 2 below will outline the findings of the content analyses performed, the new implications of social media to the theory, as well as some limitations and future applications.

Study 1

EPPM is a well-tested model that provides a pathway for successful behavior change. A politician and a public health official in theory use main similar tactics (severity, susceptibility, efficacy messages) to reach different outcomes (votes). Severity has a long history in political campaigns where candidates pander to their audiences on the danger of their opposing candidate winning (Chipman, 2016). The literature review for study 1 outlined the various components needed for a successful fear appeal. Study 1 posited that since Donald Trump was the winner of the 2016 presidential election, his

campaign's social media posts would have more messaging with EPPM tactics than Hillary Clinton's social media posts. The results from study 1 were mixed.

The severity tactic was the most frequent tactic found on the social media posts of the candidates, followed by the tactic efficacy and susceptibility. There was not a significant association found between the candidates and severity tactic in most cases. There was an association found between Twitter posts by the candidates and severity. It should be noted when the three social media platforms (Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter) were combined into one variable a significant association found between the candidates and severity. Study 1 did find an association between the tactic susceptibility and the candidates. The efficacy tactic was used frequently by both candidates. While a significant association was found between the efficacy tactic and the candidates, the social media posts of Hillary Clinton contained more messages with efficacy than her opponent. On susceptibility, a significant association was found between the tactic and the candidates. In their social media posts, Donald Trump's social media posts (17%) contained more susceptibility messages than Clinton (7%).

Results from study 1 provide insight on what components of the extended parallel process model the candidates used. Candidates favored the severity tactic and the efficacy tactic more than susceptibility. This study was unable to conclude an association between the severity tactic and the candidates, even though it had the highest level of frequency. Study 1 was able to find an association between the candidates and efficacy. In the context of the 2016 presidential election, this means the candidates did provide messaging that include efficacy and response efficacy for social media users. Trump and

Clinton used their platforms to provide their plans and information on how the public could interact with the campaign. For example, a September 3rd tweet on Clinton's climate change plan read, "Our planet's future depends on the decisions we make now. RT if you agree its time to combat climate change." The above tweet also included an infographic with nine individual actions under Clinton's climate plan. It is an encouraging sign that both candidates leaned into efficacy messaging in their social media posts. The immediacy of social media allows for activated publics to make a quick impact on a political campaign. Each candidate included links and information on how to get to their websites. Through these campaign websites an activated citizen could donate money to the campaign, sign up to attend a rally, or sign up as a volunteer.

Results from study 1 showed that the tactic susceptibility was the least frequent tactic used by both presidential candidates. This means even though both candidates did provide messaging on how someone might solve the problem presented, neither candidate focused on the likelihood of the other candidate winning. While a survey experiment was not conducted alongside the content analysis of study 1, EPPM does provide insight on what this should have meant for potential voters. The model shows different paths of behavior change based on the presence or absence of fear appeal tactics: no response, fear control processes, and danger control management. Depending on the absence or presence of each tactic, the receiver of the message will take different actions. First, if the voter believes that severity and susceptibility are low, then the voter will have no response to the messaging. When a voter perceives high severity and high susceptibility (high threat and high risk) but there is low efficacy, the voter will engage in fear control

processes. These fear control processes involve actions that seek to avoid the problem without engaging it. In the case for potential voters it could include counter-arguing, discounting the message (calling it fake news), or avoiding the message altogether (Witte, 1992). When all tactics are highly present (high severity, high susceptibility, and high efficacy) then voters should engage in danger management control. Danger management control strategies entail correct actions to minimize the threat. In a political context this would involve a potential voter donating to the candidates' campaign, volunteering, and/or most importantly voting for the candidate.

In a political campaign, a candidate ideally wants potential supporters to engage in danger control management processes. A politician needs the public to vote for him/her more than the opposing candidate. Results from study 1 show messaging on the candidates' social media posts contained a high amount of severity (that was not found to be statistically significant) and efficacy posts while a low amount of susceptibility messaging. It should be noted study 1 was only able to find a significant association with the candidates and severity when the platforms were combined and then specifically with candidates' social media posts on the platform Twitter. The low susceptibility and high efficacy would therefore mean the likely voter would engage in no response. A voter would see that there is a high threat potentially with a solution from the candidate, but there was little messaging that there was a high likelihood of the other candidate winning. A potential voter would then be led to believe the chances of the opposing candidate winning are small. These findings show that both candidates social media campaigns did not include the necessary components for an effective fear appeal message. The results

from study 1 show that voters looking at the messages from both candidates' social media platforms would have no response on their voting. Future research should include a survey experiment to verify the conclusions of this study.

The results of study 1 have a few implications for the future of political campaigns. First, political campaigns would do well to include more susceptibility messaging on their social media posts. In the 2016 US presidential campaign neither candidate used susceptibility messaging to a large degree. Of the posts analyzed in the content analysis of study 1, Donald Trump's social media posts contained susceptibility messages in 17% of all social media posts analyzed while Hillary Clinton's social media posts with susceptibility messages were less at 7%. The smaller Clinton susceptibility messages could have been due to her large lead during the large majority of the campaign. A potential voter is less likely to engage in danger management control, such as voting or donating, when they do not believe their candidate is at risk of losing. There are benefits to politicians using susceptibility messaging in conjunction efficacy and severity messaging. A message that seeks to scare publics while highlighting the risk of it happening will draw people to the solutions of a political campaign. Both candidates during the 2016 presidential election used efficacy messaging to activate their voting bases.

While the results of study 1 did not find a significant association between the candidates' social media posts and the severity tactic further research is warranted. The use of negative campaigning is not a new concept (Kamarck, 2016). The tactic of going negative has been used during every presidential campaign dating back to Adams v

Jefferson. However, there has been a rise in the use of severity in recent political campaigns. Even though the severity hypothesis was rejected, a significant association was found between social media posts of the candidates and severity on Twitter. A July 28th Trump severity tweet illustrates “No one has worse judgement than Hillary Clinton – corruption and devastation follows her wherever she goes.” Research has found negative messaging to affect voter turnout and preference (Wang, Lewis, & Schweidel, 2018). While the research in study 1 provides context on the different tactics the candidates used further research is needed on why candidates attack each other and the effect it has on voters (Haselmyer, 2019).

Study 1 also adds to the extended parallel process model. As of this writing, application of the model to previous political contexts has been extremely sparse. The literature review from study 1 highlighted EPPM application to commercial marketing where physical threat appeals were used to promote the physical consequences when someone does not adopt the recommend behavior change in a commercial. Study 1 provides a new application to the EPPM model. The preferred outcome of a public health professional and politician have a lot in common: behavior change. A politician’s goal in a fear appeal is to either encourage a potential voter to his cause (danger control management) or to negative affect turn out (fear control process). Results from study 1 show politicians social media posts contained the EPPM tactics susceptibility and efficacy.

While conclusions cannot be drawn on severity, future research on the severity tactic should provide more context on how politicians use the tactic. With a greater

number of politicians using emotional appeals such as fear, anger, and enthusiasm to spur voter turnout, EPPM has the potential to provide further context to political campaigns (Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017). Future research could also include longitudinal surveys that track the changes in opinion voters may have as they continue to receive social media messaging from political candidates. The combination of longitudinal research with experimental surveys would help to operationalize the findings of study 1 to be used in political campaigns. Future research could also focus on a singular issue in a political campaign. Study 1 looked at EPPM messaging writ large by both candidates. This included severity messaging on a range of issues such as immigration, healthcare, security, and the economy. In a political campaign not all issues are treated the same nor emphasized on an equal level. Future research could focus on a singular issue to see if the findings of study 1 hold true or vary depending on the particular issue.

Limitations in study 1 in sampling, instrumentation, and methodology did limit the effectiveness of the content analysis. In terms of sampling, the timeline and platforms selected provided a mere snapshot of the social media campaign both candidates used. The three-month timeline was chosen to provide a manageable sample that still provided the ability to view a robust number of the candidates' social media posts. Future research should widen the timeline of the sample and get a potentially deeper and richer view of the political campaign. In regard to instrumentation, the content analysis in both studies only analyzed the text of each social media post. That is not to say visual images were not included. However, only the text included in an image or infographic was coded. Study 1 did not conduct a detailed analysis of the images used in the candidates' social media

posts nor did study 1 analyze any videos published on either candidate's social media accounts on one of the three platforms used in study 1. Lastly, there is an inherent limitation in the scope of a content analysis. Study 1 and 2 provided a descriptive analysis of the messaging used by the presidential candidates. Future research should combine the findings of study 1 in conjunction with a survey experiment to explore potential behavior change paths voters may take when exposed to social media posts by political candidates.

Ultimately, there will be a continued need for research on the use of fear appeals in political campaigns. With the rise of populism, a greater number of political candidates are using emotional appeals such as anxiety, fear, and anger in order to win elections (Vasipoulous, Marcus, Valentino, & Foucault, 2019; Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017). Add the rise of fake messaging and misinformation means these consequences can have a rippling effect on civil society (Allcott, Gentzkow, & Yu, 2019).

Study 2

In most political campaigns, politicians will at some point deal with a potential scandal that can jeopardize their campaign. Study 2 started with the research question, what image repair strategies would each candidate use when exposed to a negative public relations incident? Study 2 conducted two separate content analyses. For Donald Trump a content analysis was conducted of his social media posts directly after the 'Access Hollywood' tape came out where Trump made vulgar comments about women. For Hillary Clinton a content analysis was conducted of her social media posts after the FBI released a report on the Clinton email investigation, a situation the Clinton campaign had dealt with earlier in the presidential campaign. Benoit's image repair theory provided

empirically proven tactics and strategies that candidates have deployed successfully in the past when their image has been hurt.

While study 2 found the presence of different tactics used by Clinton and Trump the results were largely inconclusive. A list of the different tactics used by Hillary Clinton can be found under table 5 in the results chapter. The content analysis showed many different tactics used in by Clinton: defeasibility, good intentions, bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, and attack the accuser. However, no significant association was found with Clinton's social media posts and any image repair tactic analyzed. Similar results were found with Trump's social media posts after a scandal with a few exceptions. Social media posts by Donald Trump following the crisis included the following image repair strategies: simple denial, defeasibility, bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attack the accuser, and corrective action. In a large number of the tactics there was not a significant association found with Trump's social media posts and the individual tactics. There were however a few exceptions discussed below. A significant association was found with Trump's social media posts and the tactic bolstering.

The goal of study 2 was two-fold: provide a social media application of the image repair theory and highlight the tactics used by the candidates in a more defined timeline. Hypotheses were posited that when faced with a negative public relations incident the presidential candidates would use the tactics denial and bolstering in response. A fifth hypothesis was also proposed specific for Donald Trump that he would also use the tactic attack the accuser. The majority of these hypotheses were rejected. The only significant

association found was between Donald Trump's social media posts and the tactic bolstering. It should be noted that while not hypothesized a significant association was also found between Donald Trump's social media posts and the tactic corrective action. An association was also found between Trump's social media posts and the attack the accuser tactic but results did not meet the standard to be considered significant.

The results of study 2 provide some insights on the success of Donald Trump's social media campaign. An association was found between Trump's social media posts and bolstering. While bolstering is a commonly used strategy, this content analysis shows it was a preferred method by Donald Trump when confronted with a political scandal (Benoit, 2007). Bolstering has the potential to be an effective tool where the candidate can talk about himself in a positive light. A Trump Facebook post on October 13th illustrates the bolstering tactic, "The corrupt establishment knows that we are a great threat to their criminal enterprise. We will NOT let them decide our future – YOU, the American people decide OUR future." The findings on bolstering confirm previous research on image repair theory's application to political scandals (García, 2011; Sheldon & Sallot, 2009).

The rejection of both denial tactic hypotheses also merits a closer look. Arendt, LaFleche, and Limperopulos conducted a meta-analysis showing the simple denial tactic to be the most common strategy used in political scandals (2017). The inability to find an association between the candidates and the simple denial could be due to the unique instance of the 2016 US presidential campaign. Donald Trump was a self-declared political outsider and would tout the norms of politics did not apply to him. Hillary

Clinton was later to be found in the right, with no wrongdoing found from the FBI's later report. Still previous research would presume that both candidates would posit a simple denial tactic. The ability for a candidate to immediately respond could allow a politician the ability to quickly and rapidly use a wide range of image repair tactics outside of the simple denial tactic.

The tactics and strategies deployed by the candidates on social media have implications for how image repair theory could be applied in the future. A politician on social media has the ability to immediately respond to any issue that might occur. Donald Trump in his four years in office has since become notorious for this. The immediacy of social media may have an impact on changing previous findings of the what strategies and tactics political candidates will use in a crisis. The tactics and strategies used by the presidential candidates could also be a reflection of the political environment in 2016 onward. Hamel and Miller found donors of political candidates react differently today than voters previously would in past scandals (2019). The changing views of the electorate can be seen clearly in the case of Trump's 'Access Hollywood' scandal when compared to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. Voters and donors today could be less punitive and more forgiving than in the past.

The results from study 2 also provide insight on the status of democracy as it relates to political candidates. If the trend continues onto multiple presidential campaigns where politicians do not engage in actions such as simple denial and mortification it can have a profound impact on democracy. When a politician does not feel the need to admit fault and announce corrective responses an incentive can exist for politicians to continue

inappropriate behavior. When politicians do not admit fault or even deny an allegation it also further decreases public trust in politicians.

There were limitations in study 2 that could be remedied to provide better results in future research. First, the decision to conduct a quantitative over qualitative content analysis on image repair could potential have been detrimental. Future research on image repair and the social media posts of the candidates could yield different results. Previous studies on image repair have been qualitative in nature, while the methodology in study 2 was a quantitative content analysis. While the frequencies of the majority of tactics used by Clinton and Trump were not found to have a significant association, a qualitative look could garner better insights. The shorter timeframe (one week) could have played a role in the lack of significant findings. In terms of platforms, both studies only gathered social media posts from the three major social media platforms: Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. Future research could add SMS/text messages, campaign emails, and/or additional social media platforms such as Snapchat or Tik Tok.

In future research, a different method could be used to examine the results from this study. The study conducted a quantitative content analysis on Trump and Clinton social media posts. However, a qualitative content analysis of the social media posts by both candidates could yield more revealing findings. This study did not look at the videos provided in social media posts. For example, one of the main responses Trump had was a video posted on his social media accounts. A transcript from FactCheck, a Project of the Annenberg Public Policy Center, of the Trump video clearly show a variety of different tactics used:

Trump, Oct. 8, 2016: I've never said I'm a perfect person, nor pretended to be someone that I'm not. I've said and done things I regret, and the words released today on this more than a decade-old video are one of them. Anyone who knows me, know these words don't reflect who I am. I said it, I was wrong, and I apologize. ... I've said some foolish things, but there is a big difference between the words and actions of other people. Bill Clinton has actually abused women and Hillary has bullied, attacked, shamed and intimidated his victims. We will discuss this more in the coming days. See you at the debate on Sunday." (Farley, 2017).

The resources of this study were unable to provide a transcript of each video posted on the social media accounts of presidential candidates. A study that includes the dialogue from social media videos could provide more context about on the tactics deployed by both candidates. The inclusion of this instrumentation would produce findings with higher reproducibility. If a qualitative analysis is not viable, another strategy that could be deployed is to increase the number of social media posts by presidential candidates. This can be done through include visual communication, such as videos, as well as increasing the social media posts to people related to the candidates. When a presidential candidate would retweet or share a social media post by someone else, this was often by a person related to the campaign and that spoke of the candidate in a positive light. Future research could expand to close members of presidential candidates (such as Donald Trump's children or former President Bill Clinton). The increase in sample size could be enough to produce significant results.

CONCLUSION

The 2016 U.S. presidential election showed that negative campaigning works. Negative campaigning has continued in local and international elections past the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Gerstlé and Nai looked conducted a case study of the 2017 French presidential election, looking at the effect of fear appeals. The authors found fear appeals captured the attention of the public and were able to transform it to their benefit. In the 2018 election cycle, the Wesleyan Media Project found digital advertising had grown substantially (Fowler, Franz, & Ridout, 2018). One study showed that news media coverage of election campaigns will often negative campaigning (Pedersen, 2014). This study provides insight on a ever-growing component of successful political campaigns; social media.

The findings in both studies provide multiple points of insight on the role of social media in political campaigns. The first study applied the behavior change model, the extended parallel process model, to social media posts from presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Study one findings showed that both candidates used various tactics required for an effective fear appeal message to work but did not meet the standard for an effective fear appeal message. With the immediacy and lack of a filter social media provides, the insights in study 1 provide insight concerning how future political campaigns could be conducted as more campaigns spend a higher percentage of

their budgets on social media campaigning. Study 1 also provides more insight on the role of EPPM, primarily applied in health contexts, as being a model that can be applied to political campaigns. While the short nature of social media posts means a message won't contain every component necessary for successful outcome changes, candidates did include all tactics across many social media posts. The findings of study 1 merit further research applying EPPM to political contexts.

The findings of study one will provide more insight on how presidential campaigns operate. As access to candidates becomes increasingly personal due to immediacy of the medium as well as the filter strength of mainstream media lessens, it is increasingly important to identify patterns on how presidential candidates act when the normal moderating effect of the media is no longer required. Future research will need to be conducted to see what outcomes occur when publics are exposed to different levels of social media posts, which will provide valuable insight on how candidates persuade the American public.

The findings of study two provide increasingly valuable context on how candidates respond in the environment of social media. Gone are the days when a crisis occurs and a president or presidential candidate has hours or a day to respond. Expectations in the modern era of political campaigning require next to immediate responses, especially when responding to crises. While the findings in study two were not proven fruitful, the potential for a qualitative review and information on tactics used by both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton show exactly how presidential candidates respond when inevitable crises happen on the political campaign. Study two provides

further context to the Image Repair Theory and help to extend the theory into modern political campaigns.

APPENDIX A

Study 1: EPPM Textual Codebook

Unit of Analysis: post from Donald Trump.

General Procedure: In many cases, you may need to read through a post multiple times. Please re-read each post as many times as necessary. You may want to take notes and make notations as you read the social media posts. In the event you read a post that contains a picture; consider the text in the picture as an extension of the original text post.

When finish, enter the appropriate codes on the coding sheet.

1. Coder ID:

2. Post ID:

3. Social Post Date (DD/MM)

4. Social Media Platform: Which platform is the post from?

- (1) Facebook
- (2) Instagram
- (3) Twitter

5. Voice: Who was the message in the post from?

- (0) Not Available
- (1) Donald Trump
- (2) Mike Pence
- (3) Political endorsement
- (4) Business endorsement
- (5) Celebrity endorsement
- (6) Family member
- (7) Hilary Clinton
- (8) Member of the media
- (9) Democratic politician (e.g., Bernie Sanders, Nancy Pelosi, president Obama)

6. Likes: List the number of likes the social media post had. _____

7. Shares/Retweets: List the number of shares/retweets the post had if applicable.

8. **Severity**: In the following questions, you are going to be asked if the social media posts talked about the severity of the problem. Severity is defined as the seriousness of a problem. This would include a message that includes threatening, fearful, or severe. The message should make the audience express negative feelings towards the opposing candidate. Posts that talk about the current negative state of the country are examples of severity messages.

- (0) The social media post did not contain a message about the severity of Donald Trump losing the election.
- (1) The social media post did contain a message about the severity of Donald Trump losing the election.

9. **Susceptibility**: In the following questions, you are going to be asked if the social media posts talking about the audience being susceptible to the problem. Susceptibility is defined as the chances of a person experiencing a threat. Messages that have a degree of susceptibility will talk about the risk, likelihood, or possibility of the opposing candidate winning, and of the candidate losing. Other posts that contain susceptibility messages include talking about the candidate being vulnerable and there being a sense of urgency to the campaign.

- (0) The social media post did not contain a message about the likelihood, risk, or chance of the threat occurring.
- (1) The social media post contained a message about the likelihood, risk, chance, of the threat occurring. (e.g., the opposing candidate is closing the gap)

10. **Efficacy**: In the following questions, you are going to be asked if the social media posts talk about the response efficacy and self-efficacy in the message. Response efficacy is defined as extent a recommended response is effective and/or feasible in preventing and/or solving the problem. Self-efficacy is defined as the belief and motivation in one's ability to achieve goals. The following question is on a 4-point scale (0=not present, 1=low/vague, 2=moderate representation, 3=high representation).

For the following, code (1) if the item is present and (0) if the item is absent.

- (0) None present
- (1) Low or vague – brief inference the recommended action or solution for solving the threat, maybe showing the campaign logo or website
- (2) Moderate representation of recommended action (e.g., more information presented, such as “for more information on the campaign”, general references for what one needs to do for the campaign.

- (3) Highly clear or elaborated recommended action (e.g., a post showing the steps needed to register to vote, volunteer, or your voting location).

Call to action: calls to action are posts by the candidates to a specific outcome. Calls to action include donate, buy/offer, competition, vote, support/get involved, find out more information.

11. Donate: Donations are posts where the candidate provides a link or asks in the post for you to donate to the campaign. Posts that have donations in it usually provide links to the campaign website where donations can be made.

- (0) The post did not include a message about donation.

- (1) The post did include a message about donation.

12. Buy/offer: Posts that include buying or offering are posts about campaign events or buying campaign merchandise. Offers include special discounts for campaign items, such as t-shirts, decals, and hats.

- (0) The post did not include a message about buy/offer.

- (1) The post did include a message about buy/offer

13. Vote: These are posts that explicitly tell the reader to go out and vote for the candidate. A post about voting could entail finding out where you can vote, when you can vote, or generally that you should vote.

- (0) The post did not include a message about voting.

- (1) The post did include a message about voting.

14. Support/ get involved: Posts about supporting the campaign or getting involved are posts about becoming a volunteer, signing up for the email newsletter, or text newsletter, and following the campaign.

- (0) The post did not include a message about support or getting involved.

- (1) The post did include a message about support or getting involved.

15. Find out more: Posts about finding out more include a post that provides a link for the reader to get more information. In most instances this will be a hyperlink to the campaign website.

- (0) The post did not include a message about finding out more.

- (1) The post did include a message about find outing out more.

16. Collaboration: Collaboration are actions the campaign asks the public to engage in to increase its relationship with the politician. Examples of collaboration are calls to donate, volunteer, or sign a petition. Talking to friends and share/retweets also are types of collaboration.

- (0) The post did not include a message about collaboration.

- (1) The post did include a message about collaboration.

17. Assurances: assurances are verbal commitments made by the candidate to the audience. Assurances can be explanations of future policy action the candidate will take.

For example, a tweet of Donald Trump saying he will build a wall on the U.S. border with Mexico is an assurance.

(0) The post did not include a message of assurance.

(1) The post did include a message of assurance.

18. Rewarding system: reward system is a set of benefits the candidate provides for voting for him/her. The reward can contain the benefit of a proposed policy, or a concrete reward for doing an action the campaign outlines. An example of a reward would be registering to volunteer for an opportunity to win a dinner with one of the candidates.

(0) The post did not include a reward for action.

(1) The post did include a reward for action.

APPENDIX B

Study 1: EPPM Visual Codebook

Unit of Analysis: images from Donald Trump's social media posts.

General Procedure: In many cases, you may need to look at the post multiple times. Please look at each post as many times as necessary. You may want to take notes and make notations as you look at the images.

When finish, enter the appropriate codes on the coding sheet.

1. Coder ID:

2. Post ID:

3. Social Post Date (DD/MM)

4. Social Media Platform: Which platform is the post from?

- (1) Facebook
- (2) Instagram
- (3) Twitter

5. Voice: Who was the message in the post from?

- (0) Not Available
- (1) Donald Trump
- (2) Mike Pence
- (3) Political endorsement
- (4) Business endorsement
- (5) Celebrity endorsement
- (6) Family member
- (7) Hilary Clinton
- (8) Member of the media
- (9) Democratic politician (e.g., Bernie Sanders, Nancy Pelosi, president Obama)

Behavior: In the following questions, you are going to be looking at the behavior of the candidate in the image. If the candidate is not show, you will code (0) for not available. Otherwise you will use a 3-point scale (1= favorable, 2=neutral, & 3=less favorable).

Face: You would describe the candidate's face in the picture as:

- (0) Not available
- (1) Favorable (e.g., cheerful, confident)
- (2) Neutral / Cannot Determine
- (3) Less Favorable (e.g., unhappy, worried, tired)

Arms: You would describe the candidate's arms in the picture as:

- (0) Not available
- (1) Favorable (e.g., cheering, waving, shaking hands)
- (2) Neutral / Cannot Determine
- (3) Less Favorable (e.g., Hanging at sides, folded)

Torso: You would describe the candidate's torso in the picture as:

- (0) Not available
- (1) Favorable (e.g., standing tall, upright)
- (2) Neutral / Cannot Determine
- (3) Less Favorable (e.g., hanging at the sides, folded)

Contexts: In the following questions, you are going to be looking at the context around the candidate in the image. If the background is black, and only provides a quote from the campaign, then you will code (0) for not available. Otherwise you will use a 3-point scale (1=favorable, 2=neutral, & 3=less favorable).

Activity: You would describe the activity the person was performing in the picture as:

- (0) Not Available
- (1) Favorable (e.g., speaking, shaking hands)
- (2) Neutral / Cannot Determine
- (3) Less Favorable (e.g., reading, resting)

Interaction: You would describe the person has with the audience in the picture as:

- (0) Not Available
- (1) Favorable (e.g., cheering crowd, attentive peers)
- (2) Neutral / Cannot Determine
- (3) Less Favorable (e.g., alone, inattentive crowd/peers)

Background: What best describes the background of the candidate in the picture as?

- (0) Not Available
- (1) Favorable (e.g., flags, signs, political icons)
- (2) Neutral / Cannot Determine
- (3) Less Favorable (e.g., backroom, isolated)

Dress: You would describe the attire of the person in the picture as:

- (0) Not available
- (1) Favorable (e.g., suit and tie, professional)

- (2) Neutral / Cannot Determine
- (3) Less Favorable (e.g., casual, wrinkled)

Find out more: Posts about finding out more include a post that provides a link for the reader to get more information. In most instances this will be a hyperlink to the campaign website.

- (2) The post did not include a message about finding out more.
- (3) The post did include a message about find outing out more.

Collaboration: Collaboration are actions the campaign asks the public to engage in to increase its relationship with the politician. Examples of collaboration are calls to donate, volunteer, or sign a petition. Talking to friends and share/retweets also are types of collaboration.

- (2) The post did not include a message about collaboration.

The post did include a message about collaboration.

APPENDIX C

Study 2: Image Repair Textual Codebook

Unit of Analysis: post from Donald Trump.

General Procedure: In many cases, you may need to read through a post multiple times. Please re-read each post as many times as necessary. You may want to take notes and make notations as you read the social media posts. In the event you read a post that contains a picture; consider the text in the picture as an extension of the original text post.

When finish, enter the appropriate codes on the coding sheet.

1. Coder ID:
2. Post ID:
3. Social Post Date (DD/MM)
4. Social Media Platform: Which platform is the post from?
 - (1) Facebook
 - (2) Instagram
 - (3) Twitter
5. Voice: Who was the message in the post from?
 - (0) Not Available
 - (1) Donald Trump
 - (2) Mike Pence
 - (3) Political endorsement
 - (4) Business endorsement
 - (5) Celebrity endorsement
 - (6) Family member
 - (7) Hilary Clinton
 - (8) Member of the media
 - (9) Democratic politician (e.g., Bernie Sanders, Nancy Pelosi, president Obama)
6. Likes: List the number of likes the social media post had. _____

7. Shares/Retweets: List the number of shares/retweets the post had if applicable.

Denial: For each social media post, indicate which of the following denial tactics were found. Check if the tactic is (0) absent or (1) present.

8. Simple Denial: Candidate says he did not perform the act.

(0) The candidate did not use a simple denial.

(1) The candidate did use a simple denial

9. Shifting the Blame: Candidate says different person performed act.

(0) The candidate did not try to shift the blame.

(1) The candidate did try to shift the blame.

Evasion of Responsibility: For each social media post, indicate which of the following evading of responsibility tactics were found. Check if the tactic is (0) absent or (1) present.

10. Provocation: Candidate explains he did offensive act in response to a different act.

(0) The candidate did not use a provocation tactic.

(1) The candidate did use a provocation tactic.

11. Defeasibility: The candidate explains there was a lack of information or control.

(0) The candidate did not use a defeasibility tactic.

(1) The candidate did use a defeasibility tactic

12. Accident: The candidate explains the act was unintentional, a mistake.

(0) The candidate did not explain it was an accident.

(1) The candidate did explain it was an accident.

13. Good Intentions: The candidate meant well when doing the act.

(0) The candidate did not explain the act through good intentions.

(1) The candidate explained the act through good intentions.

Reducing Offensiveness: For each social media post, indicate which of the following evading of responsibility tactics were found. Check if the tactic is (0) absent or (1) present.

14. Bolstering: The candidate talks about his/her other positive attributes.

(0) The candidate did not bolster himself through his social media posts.

(1) The candidate did use bolstering in his social media posts.

15. **Minimization:** The candidate tries to make the act seem not as bad as it appears.
(0) The candidate did not use minimization in his social media posts.
(1) The candidate did use minimization in his social media posts.
16. **Differentiation:** The candidate distinguishes the act from other similar, but less desirable actions.
(0) The candidate did not use differentiation in his social media posts.
(1) The candidate did use differentiation in his social media posts.
17. **Transcendence:** The candidate tries to place the offensive act in a different context.
(0) The candidate did not use transcendence in his social media posts.
(1) The candidate did use transcendence in his social media posts.
18. **Attacking the Accuser:** The candidate attacks his accuser of the offensive act.
(0) The candidate did not attack his accuser.
(1) The candidate did attack his accuser.
19. **Compensation:** The candidate provides compensation for the victims of the offensive act.
(0) The candidate did not commit to providing compensation in his social media posts.
(1) The candidate did commit to providing compensation in his social media posts.
20. **Corrective Action:** For each social media post, indicate if the post contained a tactic of providing corrective action. Check if the tactic is (0) absent or (1) present.
(0) The candidate did not commit to providing corrective action to the act in his social media posts.
(1) The candidate did commit to providing corrective action to the act in his social media posts.
21. **Mortification:** For each social media post, indicate if the post contained a tactic of mortification were found. Check if the tactic is (0) absent or (1) present.
(0) The candidate did not admit the act was wrongful and ask for forgiveness in his social media posts.
(1) The candidate did admit the act was wrongful and ask for forgiveness in his social media posts.

REFERENCES

- Abroms, L. C., & Lefebvre, R. C. (2009). Obama's wire campaign: Lessons for public health communication. *Journal of Health Communication*, 14, 415-423.
- Adams, A., & McCorkindale, T. (2013). Dialogue and transparency: A content analysis of how the 2012 presidential candidates used twitter. *Public Relations Review*, 39, 357-359.
- Allcott, H., Gentzkow, M., & Yu, C. (2019). Trends in the diffusion of misinformation on social media. *Research and Politics*, April-June 2019, 1-8.
- Ancu, M. (2015). Here comes everybody, or not: An analysis of the social media consumer of campaign content. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ansolabehere, S.D., Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1999). Replicating experiments using aggregate and survey data: The case of negative advertising and turnout. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 901-909.
- Arendt, C., LaFleche, M., & Limperopulos, M. A. (2017). A qualitative meta-analysis of apology, image repair, and crisis communication: Implications for theory and practice. *Public Relations Review*, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2017.03.005>
- Bandura, A. (1977). *Social learning theory*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Barnett, D. J., Thompson, C. B., Semon, N. L., Errett, N. A., Harrison, K. L., Anderson, M. K., ... & Ferrell, J. L. (2014). EPPM and willingness to respond: The role of risk and efficacy communication in strengthening public health emergency response systems. *Health Communication*, 29(6), 598-609.
- Basil, M., Basil, D., Deshpande, S., & Lavack, A. M. (2013). Applying the extended parallel process model to workplace safety messages. *Health Communication*, 28(1), 29-39.
- Benoit, W. L., Gullifor, P., & Panici, D. A. (1991). President Reagan's defensive discourse on the Iran-Contra affair. *Communication Studies*, 42, 272-294.

- Benoit, W. L., & Henson, J. R. (2009). President Bush's image repair discourse on Hurricane Katrina. *Public Relations Review*, 35, 40-46.
- Benoit, W. L., & Nill, D. M. (1998). A critical analysis of Judge Clarence Thomas' statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee. *Communication Studies*, 49(3), 179-195.
- Benoit, W. L. (2006). Image repair in President Bush's April 2004 news conference. *Public Relations Review*, 32, 137-143.
- Benoit, W. L. (2007). *Communication in political campaigns*. New York, NY: Peter Lang.
- Benoit, W. L. (2015). *Accounts, excuses, and apologies*. (2ND Eds.), New York, NY: State University of New York.
- Benoit, W. L. (2016). Barack Obama's 2008 speech on Reverend Wright: Defending self and others. *Public Relations Review*, 42(5), 843-848.
- Benoit, W. L., Gullifor, P., & Panici, D. A. (1991). President Reagan's defensive discourse on the Iran-Contra affair. *Communication Studies*, 42, 272-294.
- Brader, T. (2005). Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 388-405.
- Bright, J., Hale, S. A., Ganesh, B., Bulovsky, A., Margetts, H., & Howard, P. (2017). Does campaigning on social media make a difference? Evidence from candidate use of Twitter during the 2015 and 2017 UK elections. *Social and Information Networks*, <https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.07087>
- Brown, W. J. (1992). The use of entertainment television programs for promoting prosocial messages. *Howard Journal of Communications*, 3(3, 4): 253-266.
- Brown, W. J., & Fraser, B. P. (2004). Celebrity identification in entertainment-education. In A. Singhal, M. J. Cody, E. M. Rogers, & M. Sabido (Eds.), *Entertainment-education and social change: History, research, and practice* (pp. 97-114). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Brubaker, P. J. (2011). New media's contribution to presidential debates. In J. A. Hendricks & L. L. Kaid, *Techno politics in presidential campaigning*. New York: Routledge.
- Campbell, J. E., & Dettrey, B. J. (2009). Context and strategy in presidential campaigns: Incumbency and the political climate. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 8, 292-314.

- Campo Desens, L., & Hughes, L. (2013). Entertainment-education and strategic communication: A case study of Sesame's workshop's "talk, listen, connect" initiative for military families. *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 7(4), 292-309.
- Carrera, P., Munoz, D., & Caballero, A. (2010). Mixed emotional appeals and danger control processes. *Health Communication*, 25(8), 726-736.
- Chipman, I. (2016). Political machinations: How candidates cater to -- and shape --- public opinion. Stanford Business. Retrieved from <https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/political-machinations-how-candidates-cater-shape-public-opinion>
- Cho, H., & Witte, K. (2005). Managing fear in public health campaigns: A theory-based formative evaluation process. *Health Promotion Practice*, 6, 482-490.
- Chou, H., & Lien, N. (2013). The effects of appeal types and candidates' poll rankings in negative political advertising. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 23(5), 489-518.
- Clark, R. A., & Delia, J. G. (1979). Topoi and rhetorical competence. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 65, 187-206.
- Cogburn, D. L., & Espinoza-Vasquez, F. K. (2011). From network nominee to networked nation: Examining the impact of Web 2.0 and social media on political participation and civic engagement in the 2008 Obama campaign. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 10(1), 189-213.
- Connors, J. L. (2016). Visual framing of 2014 US Senate campaign: Conflict bias in news coverage. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill (Eds.), *Communication and midterm elections: Media, message, and mobilization* (pp. 115-130). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Conway, B. A., Kenski, K., & Wang, D. (2013). Twitter use by presidential primary candidates during the 2012 campaign. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 57(11), 1596-1610.
- Davis, C. B. (2013). An inconvenient vote: Hillary Clinton's Iraq war image repair debate strategies and their implications for representative democracy. *Public Relations Review*, 39(4), 315-319.
- de Hooge, I. E., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2010). Restore and protect motivations following shame. *Cognition and emotion*, 24(1), 111-127.
- Dewberry, D. R., & Fox, R. (2012). Easy as 1, 2, 3: Rick Perry and self-deprecation as image restoration. *Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric*, 2, 1-10.

- Dillard, J., & Peck, E. (2000). Affect and persuasion: Emotional responses to public service announcements. *Communication Research*, 27, 461–495.
- Dillard, J. P., Plotnick, C. A., Godbold, L. C., & Freimuth, V. S. (1996). The multiple affective outcomes of AIDS PSAs: Fear appeals do more than scare people. *Communication Research*, 23, 44-72.
- Dmitrova, D. V. (2015). The evolution of digital media use in election campaigns: New functions and cumulative impact. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dover, E. D. (2006). *Images, issues, and attacks: Television advertising by incumbents and challengers in presidential elections*. New York, NY: Lexington Books.
- eMarketer (2016). This year, more than half of Americans will use Facebook. Retrieved from <https://www.emarketer.com/Article/This-Year-More-Than-Half-of-Americans-Will-Use-Facebook/1013560>
- Erdogan, B. F., Baker, M. J., & Tagg, S. (2001). Selecting celebrity endorsers: The practitioner's perspective. *Journal of Advertising Research*, 41, 39-48.
- Farley, R. (2017). Trump's rare apology. *FactCheck*, Retrieved from <https://www.factcheck.org/2017/12/trumps-rare-apology/>
- Fasuer, T., Cauberghe, V., & Hudders, L. (2015). Social threat appeals in commercial advertising: The moderating impact of perceived level of self-efficacy and self-esteem on advertising effectiveness. *Communications*, 40(2), 171-183.
- Feezell, J. (2018). Agenda setting through social media: The importance of incidental news exposure and social filtering in the digital era. *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(2), 482-494.
- Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2010). *Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned action approach*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
- Foot, K. A., & Schneider, S. M. (2006). *Web campaigning*. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
- Fowler, E. F., Franz, M., & Ridout, T. N. (2018). The big lessons of political advertising in 2018. *The Conversation*, www.theconversation.com/the-big-lessons-of-political-advertising-in-2018-107673
- Gainous, J., & Wagner, K. M. (2014). *Tweeting to power: The social media revolution in American politics*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

- García, C. (2011). Sex scandals: A cross-cultural analysis of image repair strategies in the cases of Bill Clinton and Silvio Berlusconi, *Public Relations Review*, 37(3), 292-296.
- Garramone, G. M., Atkin, C. K., Pinkleton, B.E., & Cole, R. T. (1990). Effects of negative political advertising on the political process. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 34(3), 299-311.
- Garrett, R. K. (2019). Social media's contribution to political misperceptions in U.S. presidential elections. *PLOS ONE*, 14(3).
- Geer, J. G. (2006). *In defense of negativity: Attack ads in presidential campaigns*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Gerodimos, R., & Justinussen, J. (2015). Obama's 2012 Facebook campaign: Political communication in the age of the like button. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, 12(2), 113-132.
- Gerstlé, J., & Nai, A. (2019). Negativity, emotionality and populist rhetoric in election campaigns worldwide, and their effects on media attention and electoral success. *European Journal of Communication*, 34(4), 410-444.
- Gesser-Edelsburg, A., & Singhal, A. (2013). Enhancing the persuasive influence of entertainment-education events: Rhetorical and aesthetic strategies for constructing narratives. *Critical Arts: South-North Cultural Media Studies*, 27(1), 56-74.
- Goei, R., Boyson, A. R., Lyon-Callo, S. K., Schott, C., Wasilevich, E., & Cannarile, S. (2010). An examination of EPPM predictions when threat is perceived externally: An asthma intervention with school works. *Health Communication*, 25(4), 333-344.
- Grabe, M. E., & Bucy, E. P. (2009). *Image bite politics: News and the visual framing of elections*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Gray, J. (1987). *The Psychology of Fear and Stress*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public narratives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79, 701–721. ^[L]_{SEP}
- Greenwood, S., Perrin, A., & Duggan, M. (2016). Social media update 2016. *Pew Research Center*, Retrieved from www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/

- Gueorguieva, V. (2008). Voters, Myspace, and YouTube: The impact of alternative communication channels on the 2006 election cycle and beyond. *Social Science Computer Review*, 26(3), 288-300.
- Hamel, B. T., & Miller, M. G. (2019). How voters punish and donors protect legislators embroiled in scandal. *Political Research Quarterly*, 72(1), 117-131.
- Haselmayer, Martin (2019). Negative campaigning and its consequences: A review and a look ahead. *French Politics*, 17(3), 355-372.
- Haridakis, P., Hanson, G., Lin, M., & McCullough, J. (2015). Fitting social media into the media landscape during a 2012 Republican primary. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hendricks, J. A., & Schill, D. (2015). The presidential campaign of 2012: New media technologies used to interact and engage with the electorate. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hong, H. (2011). An extension of the extended parallel process model (EPPM) in television health news: The influence of health consciousness on individual message processing and acceptance. *Health Communication*, 26(4), 343-353.
- Hovland, C., Janis, I., & Kelly, H. (1953). *Communication and persuasion*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Johnson, T. (2015). Deny and attack or concede and correct? Image repair and the politically scandalized. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 0, 1-22.
- Kahn, K. F., & Kenney, P. J. (1999). Do negative campaigns mobilize or suppress turnout? Clarifying the relationship between negativity and participation. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 877-889.
- Kahne, J. & Bowyer, B. (2018). The political influence of social media activity and social networks. *Political Communication*, 35(3), pp. 470-493.
- Kamarck, E. (2016). Has a presidential election ever been as negative as this one? *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/10/18/the-most-negative-campaign/>
- Kaylor, B. T. (2011). Altar call: The Democratic Party's religious rhetoric as image repair discourse. *Public Relations Review*, 37, 250-256.
- Keegan, J. (May 2 2017). Clinton vs. Trump: How they used Twitter. *Wall Street Journal*, Retrieved from graphics.wsj.com/clinton-trump-twitter/

- Kennedy, K. A., & Benoit, W. L. (1997). The Newt Gingrich book deal controversy: Self-defense rhetoric. *Southern Communication Journal*, 62(3), 197-216.
- Kenney, K. (2009). *Visual communication research designs*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Kent, M. L. & Taylor, M. (1998). Building dialogic relationships through the world wide web. *Public Relations Review*, 24, 321-334.
- Kern, M. (1989). *30-Second Politics*. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Khan, L. (2016). Trump won thanks to social media. *The Hill*, Retrieved from thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/306175-trump-won-thanks-to-social-media
- Lapowsky, I. (2016). Here's how Facebook actually won Trump the presidency. *WIRED*, Retrieved from <https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-won-trump-election-not-just-fake-news/>
- Lassen, D. S., & Brown, A. R. (2011). Twitter: The electoral connection? *Computer Review*, 29, 419-436.
- Lau, R. R., Sigelman, L., Heldman, C., & Babbitt, P. (1999). The effects of negative political advertisements: A meta-analytic assessment. *The American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 851-875.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- LeDoux, J. E. (1996). *The Emotional Brain*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Lee, S., & Xenos, M. (2019). Social distraction? Social media use and political knowledge in two U.S. presidential elections. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 90, 18-25.
- Lee, J., & Xu, W. (2018). The more attacks, the more retweets: Trump's and Clinton's agenda setting on twitter. *Public Relations Review*, 44(2), pp. 201-213.
- Leventhal, H. (1970). Findings and theory in the study of fear communications. In L. Berkowitz (ED.) *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 119-186). New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Lewis, I., Watson, B., & White, K. M. (2013). Extending the explanatory utility of the EPPM beyond fear-based persuasion. *Health Communication*, 28(1), 84-98.
- Lilliker, D. G., & Jackson, N. A. (2011). *Political campaigning, elections and the Internet*. London, UK: Routledge.

- McHugh, M. (2012). How social media is sinking Mitt Romney, *Digital Trends*, Retrieved from <https://www.digitaltrends.com/opinion/how-social-media-is-sinking-mitt-romney/>
- McMahan, S., Witte, K., & Meyer, J. (1998). The perception of risk messages regarding electromagnetic fields: Extending the extended parallel process model to an unknown risk. *Health Communication*, 10(3), 247-259.
- Meeks, L. (2020). Defining the enemy: How Donald Trump frames the news media. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 97(1), pp. 211-234.
- Mitchell, M. M. (2001). Risk, threat, and information seeking about genital herpes: The effects of mood and message framing. *Communication Studies*, 52(2), 141-152.
- Moyer-Guse, E. (2008). Toward a theory of entertainment persuasion: Explaining the persuasive effects of entertainment-education messages. *Communication Theory*, 18: 407-425.
- Murphy, S. T., Frank, L. B., Moran, M. B., & Patnoe-Woodley, P. (2011). Involved, transported, or emotional? Exploring the determinants of change in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior in entertainment-education. *Journal of Communication*, 61: 407-431.
- Murphy, H., & Sevastopulo, D. (2019). Why US politicians are turning to Instagram ahead of 2020 election. *Financial Times*, <https://www.ft.com/content/737d2428-2fdf-11e9-ba00-0251022932c8>
- Nabi, R. L. (2002). Anger, fear, uncertainty, and attitudes: A test of the cognitive-functional model. *Communication Monographs*, 69, 204-216.
- Nai, A., & i Coma, F. M. (2019). Losing in the polls, time pressure, and the decision to go negative in referendum campaigns. *Politics and Governance*, 7(2), 278-296.
- Opeibi, T. (2019). The twittersphere as political engagement space: A study of social media usage in election campaigns in Nigeria. *Digital Studies*, 9(1), 1-31.
- Owen, D. (2019). *Towards a new enlightenment? A transcendent decade: The past decade and the future of political media*. Turner: Nashville, Tennessee.
- Painter, D. L., Fernandes, J., Mahone, J., & Al Nashmi, E. (2015). Social network sites and interactivity: Differential expression effects in campaign 2012. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Parry-Giles, S., Hunter, L., Hess, M., & Bhat, P. (2016). 2016 president advertising focused on character attacks. *The Conversation*, Retrieved from <https://theconversation.com/2016-presidential-advertising-focused-on-character-attacks-68642>
- Pedersen, R. (2014). News media framing of negative campaigning. *Mass Communication & Society*, 17(6), 898-919.
- Perloff, R. M., & Kinsey, D. (1992). Political advertising as seen by consultants and journalists. *Journal of Advertising Research*, 32(3), 53-60.
- Prokop, A. (2018). The long-awaited inspector general report on the FBI, Comey, Clinton, and 2016, explained. *VOX*, <https://www.vox.com/2018/6/14/17448960/inspector-general-report-justice-fbi-clinton-emails-comey>
- Rainie, L., & Smith, A. (2012). Politics on social networking sites. *PEW*, Retrieved from http://pewinternet.org/~media/Files/Reports/2012/PIP_PoliticalLifeonSocialNetworkingSites.pdf
- Ralston, R. A. (2016). *Motivation activation and the EPPM: Exploring real-time fear appeal processing* (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest. (10305529)
- Rodgers, R. W. (1975). A protection motivation theory of fear appeals and attitude change. *Journal of Psychology*, 91, 93-114.
- Russonello, G. (2019). Four problems with 2016 Trump polling that could play out again in 2020. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/23/us/politics/2020-trump-presidential-polls.html>
- Ryoo, J., Bendle, N., & Burgoyne, D. G. (2017). Understanding the social media strategies of US primary candidates. *Journal of Political Marketing*, DOI:10.1080/15377857.2017.1338207
- Scherer, M. (2012). Exclusive: Obama's 2012 digital fundraising outperformed 2008. *TIME*. Retrieved from swampland.time.com/2012/11/15/exclusive-obamas-2012-digital-fundraising-outperformed-2008/
- Schill, D., & Kirk, R. (2015). Issue debates in 140 characters: Online talk surrounding the 2012 debates. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schwartz, D. (2012). To tell the truth: Codes of objectivity in photojournalism. In J. Finn (Eds.), *Visual communication and culture: Images* (pp 223-233). Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford.

Semiocast (2012). Twitter reaches half a billion accounts. Retrieved April 29, 2017 from http://semiocast.com/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_reaches_half_a_billion_accounts_140m_in_the_US

Sharif, B. F., & Freimuth, V. S. (1993). The construction of illness on entertainment television: coping with cancer on thirtysomething. *Health Communication*, 5, 141–160.

Sheldon, C. A., & Sallot, L. M. (2009). Image repair in politics: Testing effects of communication strategy and performance history in a faux pas. *Journal of Public Relations*, 21(1), 25-50.

Shi, J., & Smith, S. W. (2016). The effects of fear appeal message repetition on perceived threat, perceived efficacy, and behavioral intention in the extended parallel process model. *Health Communication*, 31(3), 275-286.

Sinclair, B., Smith, S. S., & Tucker, P. D. (2018). "It's largely a rigged system": Voter confidence and the winner effect in 2016. *Political Research Quarterly*, 71(4), 854-868.

Singhal, A., & Rogers, E. M. (1999). *Entertainment education: A communication strategy for social change*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Singhal, A., & Rogers, E. M. (2004). The status of entertainment-education worldwide. In A. Singhal, M. J. Cody, E. M. Rogers, & M. Sabido (Eds.), *Entertainment-education and social change: History, research, and practice* (pp. 3-20). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Sternthal, B., & Craig, C. S. (1974). Fear appeals: Revisited and revised. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 1, 22-34.

Stier, S., Bleier, A., Lietz, H., & Strohmaier, H. (2018). Election campaigning on social media: Politicians, audiences, and the mediation of political communication on Facebook and Twitter. *Political Communication*, 35(1), 50-74.

Straus, J. R. (2018). Social media adoption by members of congress: Trends and congressional consideration. *Congressional Research Service*, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45337.pdf>

Sutton, S. R. (1982). Fear-arousing communication: A critical examination of theory and research. In J. R. Eiser (Ed.), *Social psychology and behavioral medicine* (pp. 303-337). London: Wiley.

- Sverson, E., Kioussis, S., & Stromback, J. (2015). Creating a win-win situation? Relationship cultivation and the use of social media in the 2012 campaign. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sweetser, K. D., & Lariscy, R. W. (2008). Candidates make good friends: An analysis of candidates' uses of Facebook. *International Journal of Strategic Communication*, 2(3), 175-198.
- Theye, K. (2008). Shoot, I'm sorry: An examination of narrative functions and effectiveness within Dick Cheney's hunting accident apologia. *Southern Communication Journal*, 73(20), 160-177.
- Towner, T. L. (2016). The influence of Twitter posts on candidates credibility: The 2014 Michigan midterms. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill (Eds.), *Communication and midterm elections: Media, message, and mobilization* (pp. 145-168). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Towner, T. L., & Dulio, D. A. (2011). The web 2.0 election: Does the online medium matter? *Journal of Political Marketing*, 10(1/2), 165-168.
- Towner, T. L., & Dulio, D. A. (2015). Technology takeover? Campaign learning during the 2012 presidential election. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Vasilopoulos, P., Marcus, G., Valentino, N. A., & Foucault, M. (2019). Fear, anger, and voting for the far right: Evidence from the November 13, 2015, Paris Terror Attacks. *Political Psychology*, 40(4), 713-717.
- Vasilopoulou, S., & Wagner, M. (2017). Fear, anger and enthusiasm about the European Union: Effects of emotional reactions on public preferences towards European integration. *European Union Politics*, 18(3), 382-405.
- Wallace, G. (November 8 2016). Negative ads dominate in campaign's final days. *CNN*, Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2016/11/08/politics/negative-ads-hillary-clinton-donald-trump/index.html
- Wattenberg, M. P., & Briens, C. L. (1999). Negative campaign advertising: Demobilizer or mobilizer? *The American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 891-899.
- West, D. M. (2017). *Air wars: Television advertising and social media in election campaigns*. (7th Eds.), Thousand Oak, CA: Sage.

- Williams, A. P., & Maioreescu, R. (2015). Evaluating textual and technical interactivity in candidate e-mail messages during the 2012 U.S. presidential campaign. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill, *Presidential campaigning social media*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, A. P., & Serge, E. (2011). Evaluating candidate e-mail messages in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign. In J. A. Hendricks & L. L. Kaid, *Techno politics in presidential campaigning*. New York: Routledge.
- Witte, K. (1992). Putting the fear back into fear appeals: The extended parallel process model. *Communication Monographs*, 59, 329-349.
- Witte, K. (1998). A theoretically based evaluation of HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns along the Trans-African Highway in Kenya. *Journal of Health Communication: International Perspectives*, 4, 345–363.
- Witte, K., & Allen, M. (2000). A meta-analysis of fear appeals: Implications for effective public health campaigns. *Health Education & Behavior*, 27, 591-615.
- Yanwen, W., Lewis, M., & Schweidel, D. A. (2018). A border strategy analysis of ad source and message tones in senatorial campaigns. *Marketing Science*, DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2017.1079
- Yates, J. F., & Stone, E. R. (1992). *Risk-taking behavior* (pp. 1-25). Oxford, UK: Wiley.
- Yun, H. J., Opheim, C., & Hanks, E. K. (2014). Whose states are winning? The adoption and consequences of social media in political communication in the American States. In J. A. Hendricks & D. Schill (Eds.), *Presidential campaigning and social media* (pp. 122-139). New York, NY: Oxford University Press

BIOGRAPHY

Peter A. Susko received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Mary Washington in 2012. He went on to receive his Master of Arts in Communication at George Mason University in 2014. While working on completing his Doctor of Philosophy in Communication at George Mason University in 2020, he has been the Director of Speech and Debate at Calvert Hall College High School.